

~~RESTRICTED~~ Security Information
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES

VOLUME 1

N17500.2
UNCLASSIFIED

NUMBER 2

THE SECRET OF THE POWER OF THE SOVIET STATE

N17500.2

Foreign military studies, Vol 1, No. 2.
European Command. 1951.

~~RESTRICTED~~
This Document

IS A HOLDING OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTION

LIBRARY SERVICES

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

DOCUMENT NO. R-17500.2 COPY NO. 1

CGSC FORM 160
18 Mar 51

Army—CGSC—P1-1367—29 Mar 51—5M

1951

UNCLASSIFIED

HISTORICAL DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN COMMAND

~~RESTRICTED~~ **UNCLASSIFIED**
Security Information



IN REPLY REFER TO: HIS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

UNCLASSIFIED

APR 18 1952

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Manuscripts


TO: The Commandant
Command & General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Inclosed for retention is a copy of each of the following manuscripts:

1. MS # D-258, Break-through of a Panzer Corps Through Deeply Echeloned Russian Defenses, etc.
2. The Secret of the Power of the Soviet State.
3. Interrogation, Arrest, and Condemnation of German Prisoners of War in Soviet Russia.
4. Disabilities of Repatriated Prisoners from Russia.
5. Small Unit Tactics - Partisan Warfare.
6. Small Unit Tactics - Artillery.
7. Small Unit Tactics - Unusual Situations.

FOR THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY:

7 Incls
a/s


LEONARD C. FRIESZ
Major, Infantry
Acting Executive

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~RESTRICTED~~

(Security Information)

UNCLASSIFIED

THE SECRET OF THE POWER OF THE SOVIET STATE

P-018e

UNCLASSIFIED Copy 5 of 100 Copies

HISTORICAL DIVISION
EUROPEAN COMMAND

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

UNCLASSIFIED

F O R E W O R D

This study is the first of a series of three dealing with experiences of German prisoners of the Russians. The second is a detailed report on the methods of interrogation of prisoners; and the third is a medical officer's description of the physical, mental, and spiritual deterioration of released prisoners. Names of authors and the reviewer are withheld.

W S Nye

W. S. NYE
Colonel, Artillery
Chief, Historical Division

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
~~RESTRICTED~~

P R E F A C E

According to its official statement of May 1950 the Soviet Union has concluded the repatriation of the German prisoners of war. The fate of hundreds of thousands of German soldiers is thereby left uncertain. The greater part of these men have succumbed from hunger, extremely heavy labor, mistreatment and physical and spiritual torment. They are silent forever and are buried somewhere in the endless expanses of Russia. However, their relatives continue to hope and will suffer until they have some positive knowledge. Another smaller number of them have "vanished," or have been "deported" or condemned to "silence." Among these latter are probably included all those who are not permitted to see the western world again because their knowledge of the Soviet system and the infinite number of crimes committed under it might perhaps be dangerous to Communism. An additional number have been condemned to severe penalties which probably none of them will survive, in view of their age and their physical and mental condition.

However, what is the condition of those who were condemned in the Soviet Union and are still alive? The evidence available to both the German government and the Western Powers is so clear and voluminous that probably nobody can doubt any longer that the Soviet Union has committed striking perversions of justice for political reasons. A number of separate reports, containing concrete statements, have called attention to these facts. The number of those condemned, some of them without a trial, without witnesses, without legal counsel, without the possibility of an appeal, cannot yet be ascertained. However, it must be considered relatively high. In order to save face, a few convicted defendants have been pardoned and permitted to return home. Perhaps more will be pardoned and released if the Western world adopts a resolute and energetic stand against these perversions of justice.

What can be the underlying purpose of these convictions? We believe it is the purpose of the Soviet leaders to spread fear and terror. They propose to bring about a paralysis of the will to resist by announcing: "Look -- this is what will happen to you if you fall into our hands!"

The German Reviewer

~~RESTRICTED~~ UNCLASSIFIED

FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES

Historical Division
Headquarters European Command

VOLUME I December 1951

NUMBER 2

CONTENTS

	Page
THE EXPERIENCES OF A PRISONER OF WAR AND THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THEM:	1
Introduction	1
THE METHODS OF CONTROL EMPLOYED BY THE RED COMMISSARS AND THEIR TACTICS OF POLITICAL DEMORALIZATION.	6
I. <u>Preliminary Remarks.</u>	6
1. Characteristics of the Soviet Union.	6
2. The Purpose of Methods of Control Used by the NKVD.	8
a. In Russia.	8
b. Abroad	8
3. Methods of Control	8
4. Characteristics of the Red Commissars.	10
II. <u>Starvation as a Method of Control.</u>	12
1. Starvation is an Incentive to Labor.	13
2. Starvation as a Means of Demoralization.	15

Foreign Military Studies: Prepared nonperiodically by the Historical Division, Headquarters European Command, for the purpose of increasing the availability of selected special studies and monographs prepared by or under the supervision of this Division and in coordination with other staff divisions of this headquarters as appropriate. The material presented herein does not necessarily reflect official Department of the Army doctrine or accepted practices, but is for information only. Local reproduction may be authorized upon specific request to this headquarters. A limited number of additional copies may be obtained from the Historical Division, EUCOM, APO 403, Phone Control Officer, Karlsruhe Military 2614.

Contents--(Continued)

	Page
3. Starvation as a Basis for Other Methods of Control. . .	16
4. Starvation as a Means for Maintaining Belief in the Materialistic Philosophy of Life.	16
5. Starvation as a Means of Physical Destruction	17
 III. <u>Maintenance of Various Factions in State of Fluctuation Between Fear and Hope</u>	 19
1. The Russian People.	19
2. Foreign Countries	20
3. The Leaders	21
4. Prisoners of War.	22
 IV. <u>The Judicial System as a Method of Control.</u>	 27
 V. <u>Propaganda as a Method of Control</u>	 28
1. Purpose of Propaganda	28
a. In Russia	28
b. Abroad.	29
2. Proportion of Truth and Lies in Propaganda.	32
3. Effect of Propaganda.	34
a. The Effect in Russia.	34
b. Effect of Propaganda on European Prisoners of War, Especially Germans	 36
 VI. <u>The Tactics of Political Demoralization</u>	 40
1. Power is Secured by the Political-Dialectical Tactics of Demoralization	 40
2. Power Consolidated by the Same Tactics.	40
a. Tactics of Demoralization in the Prisoner of War Camps from Stalingrad until the Surrender in 1945	 41
b. Tactics of Demoralization After the Collapse . .	48

	Page
3. Is the Weakening of Prisoners in the Face of Soviet Methods of Control a Crime?	52
a. The Question of Guilt during the Period up to the Surrender.	52
4. Behavior of Various Nationalities, Professions and Religious Denominations.	54
VII. <u>The Prerequisites for the Defeat of Communism.</u>	57
1. Brief Summary of the Efforts of the Methods of Control.	57
a. On Asiatics.	57
b. On Europeans	57
2. Possibilities of Resistance.	57
a. Self-Help.	58
b. Help from Outside.	59
3. The Future of Europe Depends on the Formation of an All-Embracing Philosophy.	60

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

UNCLASSIFIED

THE SECRET OF THE POWER OF THE SOVIET STATE

The Experiences of a Prisoner of War and the Conclusions Drawn from Them

Introduction

As one who has gone through the ordeal of being a prisoner of war in Russia with open eyes, and as a thinking man, this period is one of the richest in experience of my entire life. I frankly admit that I should not like to have missed these four and a half frightful years. Moreover, I believe that the experiences of captivity in Communist Russia are of essential importance in rebuilding the European world. That is why one cannot pass over what has happened in the prisoner of war camps from the time of Stalingrad through the collapse of Army Group Center in the summer of 1944, the surrender in 1945 and right up to the present time. The German prisoner of war in the Soviet Union was affected by the following two things:

1. The horrifying insight into a truly satanic state structure, the menace of which only a few people, at least in the Western Zone of Germany, are able to imagine.
2. The modern European's frightful lack of a reference point and his consequent failure to come up to expectations when confronted with the psychological methods of the Red commissars.

There is no sense in talking only about the first of these two things and keeping silent about the second. The governments and the churches, the leading intellectuals and soldiers, must come to a full awareness of what the prisoners saw and how they acted.

Modern developments in the natural sciences and philosophy show that we are embarking upon a new phase in the history of the European mind. The subject of contention is a new uniform religious-ethical world philosophy. In such a time especially it is necessary to evaluate the experiences of prisoners in the Soviet Union. The reasons are as follows:

1. We already knew the meaning of materialism before the war and today perhaps we know it even better. Above all we know this because

~~RESTRICTED~~ UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

materialism is in truth the most wide-spread philosophy of life in modern Europe and America. However, there are only a few people in Western Europe able to imagine what it means if a state carries out a materialistic philosophy of life to its last logical conclusion in all spheres of life and what a frightful picture of mankind results. I believe that no other generation has been shown the frightful consequences of this philosophy with such horrible clarity. This must necessarily have repercussions on its outlook.

2. Many thinking prisoners of war, who refused to let their spirits be crushed by the Red commissars, judge the situation as follows: We had already guessed what to expect from the Soviet state. What was far worse was the helplessness and weakness on our side, the unsuspected diffusion of treachery, even in the high-level officers' corps. What is the origin of this weakness? Have the Red commissars actually found an easy way to break spirits in their methods of psychological control and in their tactics of political demoralization? Is every resistance doomed to failure? The Red commissars easily broke the moral backbone of large groups within the German, Rumanian, Hungarian and Italian officers' corps. However, as one commissar frankly admitted to a Hungarian lieutenant colonel who was a friend of mine, in one nation they struck granite -- the Japanese.

Thus, the reason for the failure of the Europeans to resist such tactics does not appear to be solely the refinement of the Communist methods of control. The modern European has become a man without any reference point. Communist Russia has raised materialism to be the only religion. This is the great strength of the system there. They have undermined our basis for existence and this constitutes our great weakness. In addition to that each of us is drawn to different doctrines and varying political views. We no longer know where we belong, either religiously or ethically, intellectually or culturally, politically or economically. The strong characters from all nations who trod a straight and clear-cut path during their captivity in Russia did so in the majority of cases without any conscious ideological foundation, as was the case with the Japanese. They were sustained only by a naturally stable character and a natural sense of honor. But they were denied the support of a uniform philosophy of life. We fluctuated between Christ and Nietzsche, between Plato and Democritus, between Kant and Haeckel. And finally the attempt was made to attach us to Rosenberg's substitute for culture. Of course, this applied only to the Germans.

The same thing is revealed in the political field, which can always only be one part of an overall philosophy of life. Within thirty years Germany has changed its form of government four times. The Kaiser's empire was followed by the Weimar republic, then came the National Socialist dictatorship and now in the East we are developing a Communist state while in our own zone we are following Western democracy. Every form of government persecutes the followers of the preceding system. Whoever intends to assert himself must "adapt himself."

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

That is to say, we systematically broke, and are still breaking, the political backbone of the people. The result of all this is the triumph of the Red commissars.

It is the purpose of the following statements to:

1. Provide an insight into the secret of the power of the Soviet Union. In my opinion this lies in the psychological methods of control, which have been developed with satanic cleverness, and in tactics of political demoralization. Up to the present day no power or organization whatsoever, either in Russia or the rest of Europe, has shown itself able to cope with these two factors.

Modern Communism in Russia can be correctly derived from two things: Dialectical materialism and the phenomenon of Asia. Bolshevism constitutes a kind of marriage of the two elements. Only on the native soil of Asia could Marxism achieve domination. The Soviet Union is a totalitarian state in which a specific economic principle and a specific ideology are realized. Its danger is inherent in the vastness of the country, in its immense natural resources, the uniformity in methods and execution, in its ideological unity, and in its tremendous armament. Some people fear -- obviously with a bad conscience -- the revolutionary impetus with which Communism would like to force its solution of social problems on other states. All this is correct and has been discussed so often that the author does not propose to go into it. He wishes to add only one point to the debate, which, however, he is convinced is the decisive one.

The secret of the power of the Soviet Union lies primarily in its psychological methods of control and its tactics of political demoralization. Up to this time only a few people have recognized this fact. To furnish information about this question is the task of those who have been exposed to these methods and these tactics and have had an opportunity to study their effects on the Russian soul as well as on that of the Western European. When I returned home from captivity I was told: "How can you pass any judgement whatsoever on the Soviet Union? You were behind barbed wire." To this I could only reply: "I am, indeed, aware how questionable any overall judgement would be. On the other hand, however, the only person who can judge is one who has suffered under this system."

One must have experienced the methods of control and their effects on one's own body. The Russians applied the same methods of intimidation and the same tactics of demoralization to the prisoners of war as they did to their own people and the European nations subjugated by them. It is thanks to their application that they have consolidated their domination from year to year everywhere they once succeeded in infiltrating.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

2. It is my purpose to reveal the lessons for the breakdown of the majority of prisoners when confronted with this system and to indicate the prerequisites which have to be fulfilled if this system is to be effectively opposed.

The reason for the breakdown of the prisoner lies, first, as already indicated, in the subtlety of the methods of control and, secondly, in the European's lack of an ideological foundation. Ignorance of the system should be mentioned as a third factor. The latter difficulty is the easiest to remedy, and therefore must be remedied. With horror we in Russia have read again and again statements in the newspapers by important politicians, college professors, historians, theologians of both denominations which showed us how little they understood Communism. How is it possible that men of great intelligence repeatedly fall victim to the Communist tactics? During a conversation a clergyman pushed the New Testament into my hands. His finger pointed to the words of St. Paul: "Satan assumes the form of an angel of light." I believe that hitherto no system has developed the art to do this to such an extent as Russian Communism. It is a definite characteristic.

Even diplomats who have been in Moscow for a fairly long time have let themselves be deceived by the Russians. A Hungarian general staff officer who, together with his commanding general, the former Hungarian military attache in Moscow, was captured in the Battle of Stalingrad, told me the following: "While we were riding on the train to Moscow I asked the general what would probably happen to us. The general replied: 'Oh, we'll be sent to a prisoner of war camp.' I answered him: 'We will be taken to a prison and subjected to frightful pressure.' He replied: 'You are crazy! I know the Soviet Union better than you do. Do not believe those Goebbels stories!' When we left the Lubianka (Moscow prison) after a frightful year, which was the most horrible of our lives, the former military attache in Moscow said to me: 'I now know for the first time what Communism means. During my tour of duty in Moscow the commissars simply led me around by the nose!'" The fact that the Russians are able to do that again and again constitutes their strong point. Too much cannot be done, therefore, to unmask the system. This includes the following measures:

1. Making people familiar with Communist literature. One can learn a great deal about the methods of control and the political practices from Lenin's volume "The Tactics and Strategy of World Revolution," or Stalin's "Problems of Leninism." If our German, Hungarian, or Rumanian officers had read one of these books before the war, so many of them would certainly not have fallen victims to the Russian tactics. Unfortunately, today in Western Europe people are making the same mistake as Hitler! The Communist literature is forbidden. Instead of being allowed to study the enemy we are deprived of the opportunity.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

(Security Information)

UNCLASSIFIED

2. Making an accurate analysis of the personal experience gained during Russian captivity. It should be said once more! Only one who has personally experienced Communism is able to pass judgment on it!

The author will attempt to analyze the experience which he gained during four and a half frightful years as a prisoner. For one who had been a prisoner of war he became fairly well acquainted with the Soviet Union. He gained an insight into the lumber industry of the northern Urals, into forestry and agriculture in the Marizian Republic, into the industry of the Tartar Republic and, finally, he became familiar with conditions in the Russian Republic. This experience was, to be sure, far too slight to permit him to pass any judgment on the Russian economy. However, it was enough for him to ascertain that everywhere in the Soviet Union the economy and the government of the masses are directed according to the same principles. During his captivity the author was with German generals and general staff officers who had been captured during the Battle of Stalingrad. He exchanged experiences with them and with numerous Hungarian and a few Rumanian officers, some of whom had been in entirely different camps before meeting him. He therefore believes himself entitled to pass a judgment, although, to be sure, only in connection with the questions with which he is familiar.

It is clear that my estimate is in need of substantiation. Europe must not again be allowed to fall a victim to a false view of the Russian system. Prisoners of war are inclined to take a subjective view of things. On the other hand, I should like to emphasize that during my captivity I found hardly any thinking, strong-minded prisoners whose estimates of the Russian system, after long experience with it, differed essentially, although they might vary in details.

In conclusion, I should also like to express a warning. No reliance must be placed on the reports of the men who lost their honor during captivity and now seek to prove that this is not so. And of these there are many!

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

UNCLASSIFIED

THE METHODS OF CONTROL EMPLOYED BY THE RED COMMISSARS
AND THEIR TACTICS OF POLITICAL DEMORALIZATION

I. Preliminary Remarks

1. Characteristics of the Soviet Union

In order to reveal the purpose of the psychological methods of control and the tactics of political demoralization, both of which in the following pages will be called "methods of control," we must first sketch a brief picture of the Soviet Union:

a. From the point of view of government, modern Russia is a dictatorship, with dialectical materialism as its ideological foundation, and is dominated by a small group of men around Stalin. The state is held together by a uniformly trained leader class which is consolidated in the NKVD. The constitution serves merely to camouflage the dictatorial system from the outside world.

b. The Slavic, Asiatic national character, which in Western Russia dates back to 250 years of Mongol domination, gives the country its racial stamp, following the extermination of the leading upper class, which was strongly permeated with Germanic elements.

c. With respect to a philosophy of life, the tenets of dialectical materialism are put into effect to their last logical conclusion in all spheres of life. In actual practice the absolute domination of this philosophy excludes any religious, philosophical or scientific trend which conflicts with them. The religious freedom guaranteed in the constitution is merely a pretense for the benefit of world opinion. The church is tolerated to a limited extent for two reasons:

(1) In order to camouflage in the eyes of the outside world the ideological terrorism of the system.

(2) In order to serve as a vehicle for propaganda, either for peace or war, as best suits the political intentions of the State. (For this reason, incidentally, the church in the East Zone

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

has been allowed by the constitution to comment on public affairs!) See Notes 1 and 2 below. In the face of the discoveries of modern nuclear physics the Russians adhere tenaciously to the materialistic philosophy of life and use coercion against scientists who think differently. By means of dialectics they attempt to maintain fully the materialistic principles. In the controversy over the Moscow biologists and physicists many saw the first sign that the foundations of this state are gradually beginning to totter. But the present idealistic trend in modern physics will no more injure Communism than did the heliocentric system of Copernicus cause any permanent injury to the Catholic Church.

d. From the economic point of view the nationalization of the means of production has been carried out. Uniform control makes the economy flexible. The lack of private initiative and the requirements of high production quotas prejudice the quality of the goods considerably. In the field of military economy this defect is made up for by strict national supervision.

e. Judged from the point of view of foreign policy the Soviet Union is a revolutionary power which has set for itself the goal of making of the entire world a uniform Communist state. Standing beside the casket of Lenin, Stalin and Molotov swore not to rest until world revolution had been carried out.

This aspiration toward ideological expansion is linked up with the idea of Pan-Slavism, which sees Europe as merely an appendage to the vast Asiatic Continent which really ought to belong to Russia politically as well. This results in a position for political attacks

Note 1: A Hungarian Catholic priest who was a friend of mine told me in 1948 that he had already heard from numerous Russians in Kasan that the Patriarch of Moscow was actually a Red commissar, who was playing his role perfectly. However, this shows that the Russians themselves today judge the Orthodox Church to be a propagandistic pretense and a governmental means for exerting influence.

Note 2: Moreover, the freedom to preach the Gospel is also constitutionally limited, a fact which is generally overlooked. In Paragraph 124 the constitution says: "... all citizens are entitled to freedom in the exercise of religious worship and to freedom of anti-religious propaganda." That is to say, the churches are only permitted to hold religious services within the consecrated area, not to carry out missionary work (religious propaganda). Only anti-religious propaganda is allowed. Accordingly, in the prisoner of war camps where the commissars permitted religious services (only in some of the camps were they permitted) they refused, for example, to allow bible classes, alleging that this was religious propaganda.

UNCLASSIFIED

- 7 -
~~RESTRICTED~~

of the first magnitude. It finds expression in an expansionist policy (Oder - Neisse Line) and huge military armaments for which all the national resources are expended at the cost of civil prosperity. In education, hatred against Germany and the British and Americans is systematically cultivated on a large scale, as a glance at a school reader will show.

f. The social stratification of the country reveals a broad lower class, which lives in what according to European ideas is an unimaginable poverty and whose physical strength is exploited to the very limits of endurance by the dictatorial state for foreign-political goals. Above this class, which is a proletariat in the truest sense of the word, stands an intelligentsia derived from the working class. Both classes are dominated by the NKVD, which keeps the working class docile by a lying propaganda promising paradisiacal conditions, on the one hand, and by a clever system of demoralization and brutal justice (cajolery and threats) on the other. The intelligentsia, by comparison, is won over, because of the fact that, together with the NKVD, it is the only beneficiary of the system. There is no middle class. Almost the entire lumber industry of Siberia and some of the factories there are maintained by convicts, most of them political prisoners, whose number a Russian doctor in the Northern Urals once told me amounted to 25 millions. They lead a slave-like existence, the description of which must necessarily strike anyone who has never seen it as an unfounded exaggeration.

2. The Purpose of Methods of Control Used by the NKVD

a. In Russia.

(1) The purpose of these methods of control is to keep the large lower class of Russian industrial and agricultural workers obedient and win them over to the revolutionary aims of the state.

(2) These methods are further designed to halt at the outset any actions directed against the Communist system. This phase of the methods is aimed primarily at the intelligentsia, for, as is well known, it is this class and not the broad masses which produces revolutionaries.

b. Abroad. As used abroad these methods of control are designed to demoralize and undermine the other nations of the world in order to create the prerequisites for the Communist Revolution and subsequently direct the latter according to the specific rules formulated by Lenin.

3. Methods of Control

a. Starvation is applied to the large lower class, the Russian convicts and the prisoners of war as an incentive to labor and an instrument of demoralization.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

b. A constant maintenance of a fluctuation between hope and fear is applied to the intelligentsia and the working class in order to make people pliant to their will.

c. The judicial system is employed as a means of eliminating ideological or political opponents and as a threat against those who think differently.

d. Marxist propaganda, as a means of spreading the Communist ideology, is employed domestically to cultivate an aggressive revolutionary spirit and abroad to demoralize and undermine the other nations which have failed to solve social problems.

e. Subtle tactics of political sedition are used to overcome any united resistance to Communism and to cleverly enlist foreign groups in the cause of world revolution at home and abroad.

In Russia and in the countries dominated by Communism or under the Russian aegis the success achieved by the NKVD with these methods of control can be explained by the following facts:

(1) To a far greater extent than our idealistic tradition, which is so widespread in Germany in particular, would like to admit, man is a primitive being, subject to the drive of self-preservation. This is one of the most important truths realized during captivity. The anthropology of idealism has received its death blow.

(2) The great majority of modern Europeans no longer have any religious and ethical counterpoises against spiritual burdens and the instinct of self-preservation; thus they are at the mercy of the Red commissars.

(3) Most of them are unfamiliar with Communist tactics and are no match for the Asiatic cunning of the commissars.

A simple soldier once said to me -- and in so doing he revealed a better understanding of the secret of the power of Communism than a great many intellectuals -- "The NKVD plays on the keyboard of human weaknesses." And another man once told me: "Tears mean nothing to the NKVD."

In accordance with his philosophy of life the Red commissar sees human beings as material and handles them accordingly. The fact that the great majority of people are nothing more than that, in modern Europe at least, explains the triumphal march of the NKVD in the countries under the Russian aegis.

In foreign countries which are not dominated by Communism the success of the Russian tactics can be explained:

- 9 -
UNCLASSIFIED
~~RESTRICTED~~

a. By the dissatisfaction of the masses with the capitalist system arising out of social misery.

b. By the general attractiveness of the Communist phrases and the failure to see through the lies of the Red propaganda.

4. Characteristics of the Red Commissars :

Before we discuss the methods of control themselves a picture should be drawn of the one who employs them, the Red commissar.

In one thing Communism succeeded at a very early date: the fostering of a uniform type of leader throughout all Russia. Many consider the Communist's strength in developing these types as a great achievement. However their achievement is purely in the organizational field, namely, the formation of a large number of leaders on a completely uniform pattern within a short time. It is not difficult to breed a type of leader such as this, because the men trained are neither conscientious nor ethical individuals.

a. The Red commissar is a revolutionary. That is to say, he is ruthless and fanatical. His goal is the accomplishment of the world revolution. Any means to attain this is right. His fanaticism is derived from an unshakable faith in the Marxist idea. This is his spiritual source of energy. He does not believe in any god; nothing is sacred to him; he no longer acknowledges a feeling of reverence. For him everything, even human beings, is simply matter. Therefore, he also believes that they can be formed and moulded. One needs but to know the right methods. And he thinks that he has found them in his methods of control. And ninety times out of a hundred he is right. One meets these fellows everywhere; in the Urals, on the Volga, in Gorki and in Moscow. Everywhere it is the same type; whether the positions occupied are high or low. In these men we see practical examples of western secularism carried out to its last logical conclusion, a secularism which among ourselves is more or less held in check by the venge of a Christian tradition and the remnants of a bourgeois morality. We must not forget that this philosophy of life originated with us.

b. Added to the Communist-revolutionary elements are Asiatic spiritual traits, the importance of which cannot be too highly estimated. In one of the most interesting books about Russian history which I read before the war, Moeller's Russia -- Nature and Development /Russland -- Wesen und Werden/, the difference between the European and Asiatic mentality is described by using the analogy of a Don Cossack chorus. The melody is Europe, the humming musical background which gives the Don Cossack chorus its peculiar stamp is Asia. Europe is intellect, Asia is soul, a soul which is passive, which, indeed, has a tremendous capacity for suffering, but which is transferred into brutality when aroused.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

To have awakened this brutality is the "achievement" of Bolshevism. To convert it into revolutionary energy is the real purpose of Communist propaganda in the Soviet Union.

The commissar is the archetype of brutality. In addition to that the present representatives of this class are intoxicated with power as a result of winning the war, something to which Asiatics are more susceptible than Europeans. In the light of the German catastrophe it may perhaps be said that if a leader class is intoxicated with power such a thing is actually the first sign of decline. For the intoxication of power makes men blind. However, among Russians the intoxication of power is constantly kept in check by a distrust of others and themselves, a thing which is likewise inherent in the race, and by a consciousness of inferiority. The latter was lacking in the National Socialist type of leader. In the commissar the intoxication of power manifests itself abruptly, lasts only for a short time and then gives place to a distrust of others and himself.

Thus, on Asiatic soil the intoxication of power will not lead to such frightful consequences as in National Socialism. In the case of the Soviet leader all decisive actions are preceded by cautious and watchful waiting. The commissar takes his time, just as the Asiatic in general has an endless amount of time. If he knows in advance that he is superior to his enemy he tramples him under foot. However, if he is confronted by an unperturbed, intellectually trained opponent he gradually wears him down by the methods of control described in the following pages. Under certain circumstances the commissar will take years to do this.

As a final characteristic there is a craftiness unimaginable for a European. Adopting a friendly, even courteous manner he calms people, promises everything and gives -- nothing. When he is friendly, and that is often, one should generally be on one's guard. One cannot believe a word he says. The unparalleled impudence in lying, from which even a man such as Vishinsky does not shrink when addressing the world at large, will constantly deceive one who is unfamiliar with the commissar. The commissar knows this and therefore he lies.

All this may be considered an exaggeration. But I have not met any other type, unless in very subordinate positions. The commissar who does not think and act in this way cannot maintain his position and is shoved to one side.

Spengler once said: "Communism has reconquered Asia for Russia." This is true especially with regard to formation of character. Only on Asiatic soil could materialism ever produce this type of leader. He is the scourge of Russia and of the whole world.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

II. Starvation as a Method of Control

In 1947 an intelligent Rumanian professor, who later became my best friend (he had been a prisoner since Stalingrad and had seen a lot of the Soviet Union), said to me:

"Statesmen of all times have repeatedly sought a means which would enable them to rule their nations as absolutely as possible. In this respect the Communists have found the philosopher's stone. One rules through starvation."

In actual fact, there is probably no country in the whole world where there has been so much hunger as there has been in Russia since 1917. A paymaster who was a friend of mine asked a simple Russian woman in the Ukraine: "What has Communism given you?" Her answer was "Starvation. What else? Starvation, always nothing but starvation!"

Perhaps it will be said that starvation was not one of the intentions of those in power. That, on the contrary, was a concomitant phenomenon of the confusion of the revolution, during which all the livestock was destroyed throughout vast areas of Russia. And, that, added to this, are the mistakes made in the economic conversion to collective enterprises and the generally known mismanagement in agriculture, as well as the confusion during World War II, which again ruined the Russian economy, by then barely recovered. It may also be said that the fact that starvation is not a means of control is apparent from the fact that following a certain economic recovery, after 1 January 1948 the compulsory rationing of food was abolished and that from this time on hunger in Russia suddenly ceased.

The only correct thing in this argument is that mismanagement and wartime confusion actually did harm Russian agriculture to a considerable extent. However, in spite of the starvation of the civilian population the Soviets have regularly exported large quantities of grain. They were not, therefore, at all interested in putting an end to starvation, at least less interested than they were in receiving in exchange industrial products for their armament industry.

Important light is thrown upon our inquiry by a rumor which stubbornly persisted among the population of the Marizian Republic after the suspension of compulsory rationing in the first months of 1948: "This measure by the government is the best possible sign

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

that there will be a war! For if we can suddenly buy as much bread as we want the work output will decline considerably. Moscow, therefore, will have to revoke this measure very soon. The motive for this revocation will be the outbreak of war. The commissars will say to us: 'See, we wanted to give the people prosperity. But the British and the Americans have prevented it.' We are familiar with this procedure; it was just the same before the outbreak of the last war."

But, war did not develop and rationing was not reintroduced. But in place of the incentive of starvation there came the incentive of money. To be sure, the latter is not as unpleasant as the incentive of starvation. Since 1 January 1948 the prosperity of the Russian people has increased considerably. But more of that later.

The conversation of the civilians shows that --

1. Starvation is an Incentive to Labor

It is interesting to note that the civilians consider it necessary. Its abolition endangers the Russian economy. Moreover, in the discontinuation of compulsory rationing they see a sadistic artifice of the state -- and that is also significant. The latter guarantees the people bread for a few short days, only to cast the blame onto their enemies when it again becomes necessary to deprive them of bread.

I learned for the first time how starvation was employed as an incentive to labor in the winter of 1945 - 46 in Siberia, in the north-eastern part of the Urals. The entire region there was inhabited by convicts who were quartered in camps and had to perform the hardest kind of labor in the forests. Upon completing their sentences they were compelled to settle close by one of the camps. They were not allowed to leave the -- let us say -- government district. Anyone who is familiar with Albrecht's book, Socialism Betrayed ["Der verrätene Sozialismus"], which was widely disseminated in Germany before the war and the author of which had traveled widely in the Soviet Union as a forester before the war, knows what goes on there both inside and outside of the camp walls. The prisoners of war saw that Albrecht had not exaggerated.

The principle of Russian leadership is to keep the entire population systematically in a state of starvation and at the same time to display a slight improvement in their food rations in order to meet the unimaginably high working quotas. And anyone who has not experienced this personally will not consider it possible. For the sake of 300 grams of bread the hungry men work to the point of physical collapse. The hungry man knows that 300 grams of bread is not even remotely enough to enable him to put forth the maximum amount of physical energy required to meet the quotas, but the ravenous pangs of hunger drive him to this daily act of madness. How often have

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

prisoners to whom this working principle was applied experienced this in their own bodies! Hundreds of thousands have ruined their physical strength forever in this way, hundreds of thousands have died as a result. Some of the convicts are criminals, but the overwhelming majority are persons who are politically suspect, many of them Volga Germans and -- Jews. How often did somebody whisper to us: "One politically thoughtless word is enough for you to be sent here!"

In this connection the Russian government acts in accordance with the principle, that, if it is necessary to cut new timber or open a mine somewhere in Siberia, Moscow orders some Soviet province to provide labor for this purpose. The local NKVD checks the population lists, which have been prepared by means of an excellent system of political spies, and sentences the required number to forced labor. As a result, people are suddenly condemned because of anti-Communist remarks they made years before. According to the statement of a Russian doctor the entire Siberian lumber industry and some of the factories are operated by convicts. He estimated their number at 25 millions. The people die by hundreds of thousands. Concerning the railroad in the Sema area he said: "Every sleeper cost a life."

The chief lesson we learned during this Siberian phase of our captivity was that in the Soviet Union starvation is a means of control. The people are work slaves. Their strength is exploited to the point of physical ruin in order to bring about the world revolution. Use is made of the administration of justice to provide the necessary number of work slaves. Prisoners of war are workers employed to bring about the world revolution; the German internees from the plundered eastern territories, numerous Japanese and Chinese coolies serve the same purpose. There is no country in Europe where people work so feverishly as in the Soviet Union. The aggressive political and ideological attitude of the Soviet State requires this. The multitude of work slaves, which includes Pomeranian women, and even East Prussian children -- boys and girls -- down to the age of fourteen, cannot be large enough. And starvation is the satanic means for extracting the last physical reserves from human beings,

When we left Siberia in March 1946 we still did not know whether the threat of starvation was also applied to the Russian workers who were not serving sentences, in that part of Russia west of the Urals. Our stay in the Marizian Republic and along the Volga showed us that this was the case. Until 1 January 1948 the entire wages of the Russian workers were based on the same principle. This went so far that a Russian woman who did not work for the state, or a child who was not sent to the Communist kindergarden, did not get any bread at all. In 1947 Hungarian officers found villages in the Marizian Republic which had been excluded from the bread ration for years because they had not met their delivery quotas. I myself met a forester in the woods south of Joshkar-Ola, who was also a bee-keeper

and who had not received any bread for a year because his bees had not met their quota.

The replacement of the "incentive of starvation" by the "incentive of money" will be discussed at the end of this chapter.

2. Starvation as a Means of Demoralization

Starvation makes one man the enemy of the other. I have found men of strong character in captivity who privately confessed that they had to wage a severe inward struggle with themselves in order to overcome the temptation to steal from their comrades. The first time that a prisoner stole from his comrades was during the journey from Rumania to Siberia. Ninety of us were crowded into one car and were given hardly any food worthy of the name. An officer, who in peace and war had been one of our most generous comrades, stole from the common store of food. To his honor it should be said that after this single lapse he took himself in hand again and went a straight and honest path through his entire captivity. When the scandal became known in the car we were all consternated. "Even he?" I shall never forget what one colonel said to me:

"Who knows when we ourselves will stumble? This man was unable to stand up against the first severe strain. Do you know the inside of your soul? Do you know the hidden recesses of your heart? Do you know whether you will stand up against all that will still come? I fear that there will be a terrible catastrophe."

And this catastrophe arrived. Starvation broke the backbone of innumerable men who had formerly been considered incorruptible. The commissar attained his goal.

We became familiar with the demoralizing effects of starvation as early as the winter of 1945 - 46 in Siberia. In the Russian convict camps one man was the enemy of the other. The man who is biologically the stronger wants to work quickly. He wants to earn the extra ration of 200 grams of bread. The weak man knows that a fast working tempo will kill him. Woe to him if he gives expression to his thoughts -- that is sabotaging the work. The ravenous pangs of hunger of the strong man destroy any consideration for his weaker comrades. A Volga German convict once said to a comrade of mine: "Whoever does not climb over the corpses here dies himself!" The so-called brigadiers (leaders of labor squads of from 15 to 35 men) do not have to work themselves. If the brigade does not meet its quota the brigadier is removed. Therefore, he drives on his comrades in order to save his own position. Generally the men chosen for brigadiers are the most robust prisoners and the ones most inferior with respect to character, who know best how to exploit their fellows.

Comrades of mine have seen one convict kill another for the sake of a slice of bread. On the way to work the Russian guards walked between the Russian convicts and ourselves, simply to prevent a Russian from laying violent hands on a prisoner of war, perhaps because the latter was wearing a warm winter coat. Anyone who has not seen this will never, never believe it. The convicts had been completely brutalized and reduced to beasts of prey. That is the much vaunted "Stakanov system," as practiced in the forests of Siberia! And the demoralization of the prisoners of war was effected in the same way, even if among the latter the results did not take such crude forms.

3. Starvation as a Basis for Other Methods of Control

With starvation as a basis, there follows psychological enervation, which is achieved by keeping men in a state fluctuating between fear and hope. Starvation is the basis on which political demoralization is practiced. Through starvation, confessions are extorted in court; through starvation, police spies are recruited. The successes which the Red commissar achieved among the prisoners in all these fields are inconceivable.

4. Starvation as a Means for Maintaining Belief in the Materialistic Philosophy of Life

Here one's first reaction may well be: This is carrying things too far! But anyone who has been hungry himself knows that for the hungry man there is only one objective: a full stomach. I shall never forget how, on Christmas Eve 1945, after a period of starvation lasting for half a year which brought all of us to the edge of the grave, I was for the first time able to eat my fill as the result of economies in the kitchen. I lay down on my bed and called over to my neighbor: "To just eat your fill is the finest thing in the world!" However, the commissar had given the following order for Christmas Eve:

"On this evening you may stuff yourselves, you may booze, you may whore, but one thing you may not do: You may not pray!"

And on this evening the Russian convicts slunk through the camp as spies. It was forbidden to sing "Silent Night" anywhere!

The old saying "Need teaches one how to pray" is only partly true. At least, starvation achieves the opposite: it arouses the instincts of a beast of prey.

The high value of material goods is felt with special keenness by the one who does not possess them. The result is the satanic

dialectical game of Communist propaganda. The hungry man is kept continuously hungry, and is promised material happiness, as the sole true happiness on earth, as a recompense for his labor in the service of the world revolution. And the hungry man falls into the trap again and again. For even without believing in this goal he still surrenders himself to it. An estimate of the situation looks different to one with a hungry stomach than it does to one with a full one!

5. Starvation as a Means of Physical Destruction

I hardly believe that there is one thinking prisoner of war today who will deny that starvation is a means of physical destruction. The National Socialist state destroyed its political enemies in the gas chamber. The commissar is much too clever for this. He locks his enemy up in a penal camp and exploits him up to the last minute, only to let him starve as the net result. Hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war were made to starve in this way. For the outside world the mortality figures were naturally minimized. If the evidence is irrefutable the high mortality figures are justified by referring to the critical food situation caused by Fascist aggression. And again there are innocents who believe this swindle.

One may be certain of one thing and that is that the Communist state will never be able to do without starvation as a means of control. Only by such means can it keep up the inhuman overworking of the individual, which is required for the accomplishment of the world revolution. It needs starvation as a means of demoralization in order to maintain its domination in the innumerable penal camps. Since as the result of socialization there is no private profit for work performed there is need for a draconian incentive. Moreover, the Russian is so easily satisfied that he needs very little in order to be content. Once he has attained a minimum degree of civilized prosperity he is happy -- and does not work any more. Therefore, he is not allowed to attain this minimum degree too easily! Finally, starvation is necessary to maintain belief in the supreme value of material goods.

This raises two questions which require answers:

(1) How should one judge the discontinuation of compulsory food rationing from this side?

(2) Why is it that a people ruled by starvation methods did not shake off the Communist yoke during the war? The latter question cannot be answered until the end of the study.

The discontinuation of compulsory rationing, which went hand in hand with a considerable improvement in the food issued in prisoner of war camps, was, in my opinion -- and here I agree in every respect with a large number of intelligent prisoners -- due to the following reasons:

(1) During 1946 - 47 the morale of the population had declined considerably. Reports of the Russian soldiers about the blessings of European civilization, and the high standard of living of the German working class, had a demoralizing effect. Some approximation of these conditions, if only a modest one, was indispensable.

(2) For twenty years the Soviet government had blamed the starvation of the people on its enemies abroad and had promised an earthly paradise in case of a Russian victory.

The commissar is an artful psychologist. He knows exactly -- we will observe this frequently later on -- how far he can and cannot go. It was simply impossible to avoid relaxing the food restrictions any longer. The relaxation also produced an immediate change of mood among the people. To be sure, the standard of living of the majority of the Russian workers is still very low even now that rationing has been discontinued. For the monetary incentive took the place of the incentive of bread. Wages are so low that the great mass of the people can, indeed, buy enough bread; but butter, meat, fish, and the like are, just as before, beyond their reach. In practice, the incentive of money is only a milder form of the threat of hunger. However, and this is psychologically important, the new condition was received as a tremendous blessing by a people who had known nothing but hunger for centuries.

Whether and to what extent further relaxations may be necessary in the future, or whether the men in Moscow will revert to the old system, only time will tell. It has, I hope, become clear that, as a matter of principle, the Soviets cannot avoid keeping the standard of living low by artificial means. The measures to relieve hunger in the prisoner of war camps in the winter of 1947 - 48 is undoubtedly to be attributed solely to the effects of anti-Soviet propaganda. The Red commissar perceived that the demoralizing Communist propaganda in the western nations would fail as long as only starved men returned to Europe from the Soviet Union, so the starvation methods were suddenly stopped. To the rulers in the Kremlin the flaw in their propaganda constituted by the starvation program appeared a greater disadvantage than the discontinuation of hunger as a work incentive. Here again one sees how flexible the tactics of Moscow are. More will be said on this subject in another place.

III. Maintenance of Various Factions in State of
Fluctuation Between Fear and Hope

1. The Russian People

To keep people constantly in a state fluctuating between fear and hope is the most important means of control employed by the NKVD in Russia. By this means one breaks spirits and obtains submissive individuals. All other means of leadership also serve to bring about this fluctuating condition. Starvation creates fear for one's life. To once eat one's fill is the great hope. Political propaganda, insofar as it is directed at the opponent, is intended to spread fear by means of its ruthless fighting slogans while yet arousing the hope of eventual prosperity for all. For the faithful Communist, on the other hand, the promises contained in these slogans represent the great hope, sustaining him in an intermediate condition which is characterized by an ostensibly necessary pressure on politics and work which is without equal. A brilliantly organized system of police spies creates distrust and fear even between members of a family. An attempt is made to break the backbone of political enemies, who have been denounced for anti-Communist activities, by instilling in them the hope that they may rehabilitate themselves by serving as informers.

The Communist state in Russia cannot exist without these means of control for the following reasons:

a. Because it is an Asiatic dictatorship it is even less tolerant of the free individual than are European ones. Because of their Asiatic distrust they feel compelled to break the backbone of every individual. Asia has never heard of free-thinking citizens, but only of subjects, who are kept in a state of fear and blind obedience. The great superiority of Communist Russia over the czarist regime is that it gives the people, who now as then are kept in fear, the hope of a future on earth.

One can say, for example, that the czar ruled only through fear. Only the church was able to give any hope. The fulfillment of this hope was postponed until after death. The Communist state, on the other hand, causes hope of happiness on earth to arise against a background of fear. And -- this too is psychologically interesting -- the more frightful the pressure of the present is, the more human beings become attached to the picture of the future painted by propaganda. We Europeans do not understand this. The NKVD, however,

knows the mentality of the people. The Russian commissar, therefore, cannot do without fear. The longer one is in Russia, the more one gets the impression that the Soviet Union is a purely imperialistic, Asiatic dictatorship and not the Marxist dictatorship of the proletariat. The top-level Russian leaders no longer serve the Marxist doctrine. They see in it only a means of maintaining their dictatorial rule or of extending it to Europe.

b. It is impossible to dispense with fear and hope as means of control because it is impossible to establish any ethical system on the basis of materialism. This philosophy sees in human beings creatures driven by instinct and subject to natural law. The possibility of any elevation above a purely animal level into the realm of moral freedom is denied. Thus, the Soviet dictatorship cannot build upon such ethical concepts as loyalty, honor and the performance of duty. It must appeal to the biological instincts. That is to say, it rules through fear and at the same time announces its leader as the bearer of a future material salvation. Every trivial improvement in the people's heavy present lot is celebrated as a "gigantic progress." And the louder propaganda proclaims this, the more it is believed by the apathetic masses of Slavic Asiatic character, brooding in their misery. As a result, the Communist leader is honored, indeed even worshipped.

In modern Russia fear and hope are in a very definite proportion to each other. One can say, more or less, that fear characterizes the present and that hope refers to the future. Fear is chiefly aroused by the acts of the commissar and hope by his promises.

2. Foreign Countries

The purpose of the influence exerted by Russia on foreign countries is not, so to speak, merely to make positive conquests for Communism but also to spread terror. Here again, there is the interplay of hope and fear. This will be discussed in detail in the chapter on propaganda. Here, and in this connection, we might cite as an example the tactics of the Soviet Union in the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war. At first they give a promise, dripping with humanitarian phrases, to send all the prisoners home by a definite date. However, they cause transportation to run so sporadically that there is fear that the promise might not be kept. In response to inquiries they first declare: "The Soviet Union keeps its word. Irresponsible anti-Soviet propaganda is stirring up doubt in the minds of the prisoners' relatives in order to subject them to mental anguish." And if, thereupon, the promise is not kept some clever excuse is given and immediately there is a new promise, perhaps coming from Stalin himself. The whole world takes new hope. It is inconceivable that the head of state of a great country should discredit himself by not keeping this promise. It is naturally not kept. In actual truth no promise

has any real background. All the statements have only one purpose and that is to wear down the mind of the enemy of tomorrow. In order that hope may not vanish altogether, a few shipments of prisoners are naturally always sent home.

In this way the Soviet Union plays cat and mouse with the various countries of the world in all fields of politics. (See note below.)

3. The Leaders

It is not only the marshals and higher political leaders who are in danger of being exiled if their power becomes too great for the rulers in the Kremlin. On general principles, every commissar has one foot in prison. He is fearfully concerned not to deviate by a hair's breadth from the Party line and not to fail to carry out all orders scrupulously and unconditionally.

In the prisoner of war camps and in the Russian Zone of Germany the Russians appoint to positions of leadership Germans who are -- insofar as possible -- submissive and inferior characters. It was the same in every camp. With rare psychological skill the Russians pick out the men with ambition. From these they select a man who from the Russian standpoint earned a black mark in his past and they appoint him a leader. They tell him that he can buy his way out if he works for them. Thus, these creatures live constantly in the fear of being exiled to Siberia and in the hope of escaping the Russian legal machinery by their services. The commissar gladly allows them to satisfy their ambition and their thirst for power. One should not merely assume that Herr von Lenski, Vinzens Mueller, Herr Steidel and other former senior officers who are today

Note: This also explains the amnesty granted to German war criminals, which has been in force since April 1950. Terror was spread by the mass convictions of December 1949. Every military leader of this war or the next was to know that whoever fights against the Soviet Union dies. And the same men who were sentenced to 25 years of forced labor in December 1949 are granted their freedom in April 1950, although actually only some of them benefit. Thus, fresh hope is sown in Germany and among these prisoners who are still in the Soviet Union.

This procedure has been customary for years in the penal camps for Russian civilians. At one time there are mass convictions, which are always followed by sporadic amnesties. Thus, even a Russian who has been sentenced to 25 years forced labor lives on hope. Naturally, the amnesties are not numerically proportionate to the mass convictions. But the greater his misery, the more a human being lives on hope.

serving the Russians in the East Zone are convinced Communists. Those who knew them before know that they are ambitious men. And those who are familiar with the penal principles of the Russian legal system know that in the opinion of the Soviets they are war criminals. They have no other choice but to work for the Soviets or go to Siberia for 25 years. A general lack of character and the morbid ambition to play a part of some importance makes them choose the former course. Moscow does not permit any other type of leader in the countries occupied by Russia.

4. Prisoners of War

What the Soviet Union has accomplished here in the tactics of mental enervation is probably unique. For every prisoner of war in other countries his return home was merely a question of time. For the prisoner in the Soviet Union it was, up to the very minute when he crossed the German border, a question as to whether he would ever see home again. To keep up the fear of not being allowed to return home and yet, at the same time, to arouse hopes of a speedy return again and again, was the horrible game played by the NKVD. Its purpose is to break spirits. The game is carried so far that the commissar takes out one, but more often several, prisoners from every transport returning home and takes them back to camp. In my train there were more than 500. I frankly confess that I was seldom so agitated in captivity as I was on my way home. The prisoners officially assigned to the train came to the camp gate for their departure. There were 550 men. They pass through the gate one by one. Fifty were held back. They are to remain at the camp. Of the 500 who had already passed through the gate 17 -- including myself -- were led into a room beside the guardhouse with the statement that it was not yet certain whether we would go along too. After two hours of waiting we were also allowed to march to the railway station. Shortly before the train left about 50 more men were taken off it and sent back to camp. And after a seven days' journey the last man, a colonel, was taken off the train at the Russian border.

During my entire captivity I never saw any group leave for home to which something similar did not happen. The purpose is clear. Up to the very last minute the man returning home must be kept in a state fluctuating between hope and fear. Preferably, it is prisoners who are to be brought before a court who are first sent homeward. By taking such men off the train it is hoped that they will be worn down to the point of giving no trouble in court.

The satanic forms assumed by the tactics of the NKVD are best shown by a few personal experiences in connection with the question of the work done by field officers.

During their captivity in Russia field officers were not obliged to work. For international reasons the Soviet Union never permitted this rule to lapse. On the other hand, however, there was certainly no camp in the whole Soviet Union where the commissar did not try constantly by means of pressure and intimidation of every kind to force field officers to work. This was done for the following reasons:

a. In order to exploit the working strength of the prisoners down to the last man.

b. In order to leave the intellectuals in particular no time for reflection.

c. In order to break their moral backbone, to "reduce him to a pulp," as we used to say. That the Russian principle of work has this secondary objective has been made clear in the chapter on "Starvation as an Incentive to Work." It should not be said that the pressure to perform work exerted upon the field officers was a local excess of authority by subordinate offices. The pressure was also and more particularly exerted by the government commissions of Moscow and Kasan. I shall never forget that on the occasion of an inspection of our camp the director of the prisoner of war branch of the Kasan ministry received the Russian camp commandant and his assistants in our room, so that we were supposed to overhear the conversation that followed.

"What kind of do-nothings are these men?"

"Field officers," answered the Russian commandant.

"Why don't they work?"

"Because they don't want to."

"You shouldn't give them any heat and any winter clothing. You should tell them frankly what they are, reactionaries and fascists, enemies of the Soviet Union. They will be the last ones to go home."

Thereupon the high-ranking NKVD officer left the room.

In another room the same NKVD officer was officially asked by the German Room Senior whether the compulsory labor measures of the local commandant were justified. "No field officer is obliged to work," he answered. Nothing further was added.

Here we recognize a new characteristic of the Russian system. In the Soviet Union there are always two orders, the official order,

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

which is a pretense intended for the outside world, and the secret order which prescribes the method to be followed in actual practice.

A commissar once said to us when we were all assembled in a group: "If you are unwilling to work you won't get home until I am captured as a prisoner of war by the British or the Americans!" I believe that this statement requires no further explanation.

Without wishing to be verbose I believe that it is necessary to give one last example from the camp in the Marizian Republic, in order to show how one of the greatest masters of the NKVD whom I ever knew brought the state of fluctuation between fear and hope to its highest degree of perfection by simultaneously using all methods of control. The satanic tactics he employed to wear down our nerves led to a degeneration within the officers' corps which, for me, will always be one of the frightful memories of my captivity.

The basis of his tactics of attrition was starvation. In the summer of 1947 we were given, three times a day, a water soup made out of rank radish leaves (the radishes themselves were withheld from us) with 200 grams of inferior bread apiece, sometimes some inferior meat and some grits. All other food was replaced by radish leaves which were of the consistency of wood.

Our quarters were completely unprecedented. We lived in huge, drafty, wooden, lice-infected barracks, which had a leaky, wooden-shingled gable roof without a ceiling in between. Rats, mice, bedbugs and fleas were our constant companions. Everybody captured at least 50 fleas a day on his body. In the spring the barracks swarmed with flies.

We protected ourselves in part from vermin by constructing so-called "submarines," a Rumanian "invention." That is to say, we took our linen mattresses, for which we had no straw anyway and lengthened them by means of the linen bed sheet. The long linen envelope thus created was sewed together four times. At night we crawled in naked through the top end and closed the bag from the inside by twisting together the open end. In order to get more air we suspended a horizontal wooden cross (having staffs about 50 centimeters long) from the ceiling, at a height of about 50 centimeters above our bunks and fitted the linen bag over this cross before twisting together the end of the cloth, so that we had an air pocket about 50 centimeters high over our faces. The everlasting water soup weakened the bladder so much that we had to leave the bags about every three hours. In crawling in again one unfortunately took numerous pests with him, which had to be killed inside the bag before sleep was possible. Light of any kind was lacking. In the beginning we illuminated the barracks during meals by burning wood shavings. Later we stole kerosene and made ourselves makeshift lamps.

In order to starve us mentally, our last books, with the exception of Marxist propaganda literature, were gradually stolen from

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

us. In my own use I copied the Gospel according to St. John from the last available copy of the New Testament. Since all writing materials were deliberately withheld from us, I used the wrapping paper of cigarette packages for this purpose and wrote with blood and a goose quill. And this in the twentieth century in "the most progressive and humanitarian state" in the world!

Propaganda officers and enlisted men were employed on downright humiliating work. Eight to ten men at a time were harnessed like horses to a steel cable to pull sleds loaded to capacity with construction lumber. The steel cable ate into their chests. On repeated occasions officers or enlisted men fainted from exhaustion during the evening roll call.

Officers were forbidden to write.

This was the background against which was played the drama of political demoralization and demoralization through working conditions.

Here I shall merely describe the procedure by which an attempt was made, which to a great extent succeeded to break the backbone of the field grade.

To begin with, the chief commissar of the camp played off the field grade officers against the company grade officers by declaring: "In our camp there are still fascists who do not work for the Soviet Union. These are the field grade officers. That throws a bad light on the entire camp." The German anti-fascist propaganda instigated by the Russians immediately started. In meetings the field grade officers were described as sluggards who were to blame for the fact that the Russians regarded the prisoners with distrust. The commissar hinted that only men who worked would ever see their homes again. Paralleling this terrorization went a system of recruitment which worked by positive means. The staff officers were told by the commissar that since field grade officer-work was voluntary they might naturally choose their place of work. They would not be required to pull timber sleds. They might report for lighter work within the camp. The purpose of this "graciousness" was to employ on heavy labor outside the camp the last common soldier who was required to work. The purpose was accordingly twofold; first, exploitation and, second, to direct the anger of the enlisted men against the field grade officers.

At the same time the field grade officers were promised an extra ration of bread each day. However, each camp received only a specific number of additional rations. Therefore, these rations would have to be taken away from the men required to perform heavy work. This was, accordingly, one more means of stirring up the

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

other camp inmates against the field grade officers. And yet for all that, the extreme hunger, the fear of never seeing one's home again if one refused to work, caused a disgracefully large number to give in. Those who could not reconcile such a step with their conscience and their honor were reviled as fascist "moral athletes" by their own comrades.

The Russians, however, took reprisals. They put the non-working Germans, Hungarians and Rumanians in special barracks -- the worst in the camp -- and locked them up there night and day. A stinking, leaky bucket was placed in the barrack for toilet facilities. But there was worse. The commissar appeared in these barracks and announced that if anyone volunteered for work, the black mark against him would be erased from his conduct record and -- he could write home as a reward. Now came a terrible conflict. Was it permissible to take away an enlisted man's good job and abandon him to exploitation for the sake of being allowed to write to one's family, regardless of the fact that the family had been living in uncertainty for years relative to the fate of their loved one?

Again some men reneged and reported for work. These were the Communist tactics of attrition. This was how they broke the backbone of a former officers' corps.

The most terrible situation, however, occurred in May 1947. The labor detachment, which had been promised permission to write home by the commissar on the condition of volunteering for work inside the camp, was ordered by him to fence off the barracks occupied by those of their comrades who refused to work and to wire up the windows. Fearing that the commissar might stop the postcards they were sending home these officers carried out his orders. And even though, on the very next day they refused to do their work, from that time on the solidarity was broken.

Here for the first time we see the frightful psychological effect of these satanic tactics of attrition. However much one must condemn the behavior of the men who worked, one must also, on the other hand, deny anyone who was not in the same situation the right to condemn them.

In order to remain objective it should be added that the tactics of demoralization described here were those practiced by one of the greatest masters of the art. The other commissars were not so skillful at it, although there was also an imitation of this artistic game in the other camps. There was evidence of the same training everywhere, although not all commissars were such virtuosos. Starvation and the nervous strain induced by the fluctuation between fear and hope, however, not only led to a loss of comradely solidarity but also at the same time prepared the ground upon which the tactics of political demoralization described in Chapter VI were carried out.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

(Security Information)

UNCLASSIFIED

IV. The Judicial System as a Method of Control

(Discussed in a Special Study)

1. Purpose of the Judicial System.
2. The Judicial Methods Followed in the War Crimes Trials.

The judicial system is a country's calling card. One can best inform oneself about what Communism means, therefore, by studying the judicial system.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

V. Propaganda as a Method of Control

1. Purpose of Propaganda

a. In Russia. The purpose of Soviet Russian propaganda at home is twofold.

(1) Russian propaganda at home is designed to gain as strong elements of the population as possible as supporters of dialectical materialism and Marxism. A special effort is made among the youth to cultivate the archetype of the Communist revolutionary. For young people a socialist program as well as a high evaluation of material goods have a considerable attraction. At the same time the Russians are given the sense of a national slavic mission. The Soviet Union is the liberator of the European nations from the capitalistic yoke.

An essential part of the world revolutionary, however, is also a fanatical hatred of his opponent. This is instilled into the children in the schools. Even today, five years after the war, one finds in school readers such sentences as "Kill as many Germans as you can!" As a result of the altered political situation hatred of the American capitalists will naturally take first place.

(2) Besides actual proselytizing the purpose of the propaganda is also to intimate those who think differently from the Communists. Whoever deviates even by one iota from the materialistic doctrine is an enemy of the people's state, a criminal. He offends against the "truth!" It is the ethical duty of each Communist to unmask the enemy of the socialistic order of society and hand him over to justice. Here again, therefore, we have the peculiar conjunction of a hopeful picture of the socialistic future and a fear-inspiring challenge to the enemy.

All that is necessary is to listen to a political meeting. Many prisoners had an opportunity to do so in the factories. And if a prisoner did not have this opportunity the Russians revealed their tactics to him at the camp meetings of the prisoners of war which were staged according to the same scheme.

A board was first elected. In advance, the commissar gave trustworthy Communists, who, in the prisoner of war camps, were the "activists," the names of the men whom he wanted on the board. The

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

commissar had barely opened the meeting when the "activists" called out to him the desired names. If anybody dared to propose some other name the activists immediately delivered speeches which emphasized the preferability of the candidate desired by the commissar and, under certain circumstances, denounced the outsider's political character in such a way that it appeared impossible for any member to give his vote to the latter. The meeting then began. At first there was generally a speech of an ideological and political nature. At all the important points the activists distributed throughout the hall showed their approval by wild applauding. Most of the audience applauded too. The subjects of the speeches and the addresses following it, given by "forum speakers," were determined in advance by the commissar.

Then came the real subject of the meeting. In the factory meetings it was generally a question of how the work output could be increased in order to exceed the quotas prescribed by the government. In connection with this mediocre workers were mentioned by name. They were enemies of the socialist principle. But failure on the part of the factory management was also emphasized. The commissar sat at the board's table, apparently without taking part, but he listened closely to each speech. A recorder was required to take accurate notes of the names of the speakers and the subject of their speeches. Then, in conclusion, the record was analyzed politically by the commissar.

Thus, everybody guarded himself against saying anything which might be assumed to run contrary to the commissar's purpose. As a general rule the meeting ended with a resolution which the commissar had prescribed in advance and which was proposed by an activist. At the factory meetings it generally included a telegram of congratulations to Stalin in conjunction with a promise to meet the government quota, for example, in half the prescribed time. A vote was taken. This was always public, for its purpose was to unmask enemies. The commissar's eye surveyed the hall. Woe to him who dared to vote against the resolution! He was an enemy of the socialist workers' state. Everybody knew what that meant. No matter how hungry he might have been, no matter how different his working conditions were, and however unobtainable the objective of the resolution, none dared to vote "no."

Thus, along with its objective of winning converts for socialist work, it is clearly apparent that the purpose of the meeting was to intimidate those who thought otherwise. During their captivity some prisoners came to grief by daring to speak up at such meetings and interrupt the commissar's ideas. This is counter-propaganda, which is punishable by law.

b. Abroad. The difference between Russian foreign and domestic propaganda is that the application of proselytizing and intimidation

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

undergoes a shift of emphasis. The purpose of foreign propaganda is chiefly as follows:

(1) Demoralization. This calls for the political application of the so-called dialectical methods.

(2) Terrorization. This is called for by traditional customs of a Slavic Asiatic nature.

Concerning (1): Propaganda prepares the way for the dialectical methods of demoralization. What these dialectical methods mean from the philosophical point of view is well known. The Rumanian professor, who has already been mentioned, made clear to me their political application with a very drastic example drawn from the history of his home town in Bessarabia. In principle, they are applied in the same way in every country which the Soviets enter.

"When the Russians entered Bessarabia at the beginning of the war," the professor said, "they saw in each of our villages an entity consisting of various opposing factions, such as the owners of farms of large, intermediate and small sizes and the day laborers. During the first phase of their occupation the Russians spread propaganda describing the owners of the large farms as the ones who exploited the common man in acquiring their extensive properties. The town meeting dispossessed these owners and divided their lands chiefly among the owners of the small farms, but some of the owners of the intermediate sized farms obtained shares of the seized land.

"During the second phase propaganda was directed against owners of the medium sized farms after which the democratic assembly, in which the poorer farmers represented an overwhelming majority, dispossessed these owners. Thus there remained only the owners of small farms.

"During the third phase the hired men and the servant girls working in the remaining small farms were stirred up against their masters. They found that it was detrimental to the overall agricultural economy to divide up the soil and that the degradation of people into servants was contrary to the basic principle of liberal socialism. Propaganda calling for collective farms was introduced and when such farms were established the final phase was completed. Only servants were left.

"The desired goal was thereby attained. No one owned anything any longer. They were all dependent on the state and were regarded by the state only as "workers" who were moved here and there throughout the vast territory of the Soviet Union according to the interests of the Russian government."

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

The first objective of propaganda is accordingly to prepare for the demoralization and subjugation of all, and this is to be attained by dialectical methods.

(Here a brief digression may be permitted. Again and again there are people in countries which have just been conquered by Communism who deceive themselves into thinking that socialization will end with the second or third phase of development. In those countries, however, which are occupied by the Soviet Union, such as the East Zone of Germany, Hungary and Rumania, it is important for the Soviet Union to render all the inhabitants submissive. In these countries especially, therefore, it (the Soviet Union) will not refrain from carrying out the final phase of socialization. One must realize that no matter how flexible the commissars are in their tactics, they are just as logical in carrying out their final objective, which is the achievement of the Communist state, where the materialistic view of the world prevails in all spheres of life.)

In foreign countries which the Soviets do not hold by armed force, the purpose of their propaganda is to demoralize the people by inciting the landless and intimidating the bourgeoisie. For this reason the Russians are not at all interested in having foreign countries remain ignorant about the purge of the Russian intellectuals which took place from 1917 to 1918. It is intended that the capitalistic world shall know that enemies of the Marxist economic order are physically eliminated.

Toward bourgeois delegations sent to Russia whom the Soviets want to win over, in order to demoralize the bourgeoisie front, they naturally deny any destructive intentions. They speak of the same rights for all, of freedom and humanity and show them a few "Potemkin villages." Thus, they deliberately sow hatred between those who realize that Moscow intends to destroy them and those who, as the result of visiting Russia, see lying capitalistic propaganda in any exposure of the Soviet Union. And here it is the task of Communist propaganda, first to permit a glimpse of the tendency toward destruction and, second, to conceal the real intentions of Moscow and paint the devil as an angel of light. Here the hypocrisy of Soviet propaganda is apparent.

Concerning (2): In Slavic Asiatic history terrorization has always been a popular means of crippling the enemy. A wave of terror was prepared in advance of the attacking hordes of Jenghis Khan. If they attack the Russians intend to do this even in the present day. That is the reason for murder, looting and mass rapes in the conquered territories. One misunderstands the situation if one sees in these things only the excesses of a cruel Asiatic mentality. In view of the tremendous discipline existing in the Russian army the commissar could easily stop such excesses, but he does not want to. The objective at which he is aiming is seen all too clearly in the fear psychosis of the West German population regarding a Russian invasion. How many people intend to

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

send a bullet through their heads if the Russians come! Fear paralyzes any will to resist.

When we learned of the frightful misery of the Russian convicts in the winter of 1945 we thought naively that we must have been sent into these regions by mistake, since the Soviet government could only be displeased if prisoners reported back home about the misery they had seen there. In the course of our captivity, however, we ascertained that hundreds of thousands of men were permitted to witness these and similar conditions. But it took a comparatively long time before we realized that the commissar deliberately wished to arouse fear and spread terror as a part of their propaganda. Those who today report in the newspaper the most frightful things about living conditions in the Soviet Union, the atrocities committed by the commissars, are unintentionally furnishing aid to Moscow. One only has to think how the dread of the Russians, which developed after the battle of Stalingrad, undermined the fighting morale of the German army in the East.

The low percentage of Communists in the Western zones of Germany shows that the Russians have gone too far with their German policy. The number of Communist voters is too low for them to bring about any Communist demoralization in Western Germany. If war should ever break out between the West and the East however, the Soviets will have one advantage and that is the paralyzing fear of the population of Western Germany. In France and Italy, despite all the anti-Communist propaganda on the part of the Rightist parties and the Catholic Church, the Russians have succeeded with their tactics of demoralization. Thus, without American aid, Europe would fall like ripe fruit into the lap of the attacking Soviet Union.

2. Proportion of Truth and Lies in Propaganda

I shall quote a few sentences from a lecture which J. Goebbels delivered in 1937 to a private meeting of officers on "The Secret of Propaganda."

"Whoever intends to carry on propaganda must be convinced of the granite-like stupidity of the masses! If I tell them something which is not true only once they will not believe it. If I tell it to them fifty times they will not believe it. But if I tell it to them a hundred times they will finally believe it. You see, gentlemen, by betraying this secret to you I am also making propaganda! For by so doing I have picked you out of the mass!"

This recipe was undoubtedly stolen from the Russians. Goebbels even admitted this. For the Communists it is no longer at all important whether what they say in their propaganda contains even a

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

germ of truth. In 1947, when the civilian population of the Mari-zian Republic was almost starving, they were told a story about what prosperous conditions these were living in compared with the Western European and American workers, and this at a time when the first Russian soldiers were returning home on leave from European countries spreading a wave of whispered propaganda which ran through the population, painting Western civilization in the brightest colors. Naturally, nobody dared to contradict commissars at political meetings, for that was the very time when the commissars hoped to uncover the enemies of the system.

In Europe we are accustomed to discount party propaganda. But we say: "There is something true in all of that." This attitude had become so much a part of us in us that during our captivity we repeatedly let ourselves be seduced into believing at least parts of the Soviet propaganda promises despite our knowledge of their completely mendacious character. And we were punished for this again and again! The commissars were aware of our inability to adjust ourselves to an opponent who is completely unscrupulous, for whom truth no longer means anything. And he capitalized on this and is still capitalizing on it. One brief example of this is shown when, shortly before we left the Soviet Union at the beginning of December 1949, we were told repeatedly at numerous propaganda meetings:

"All prisoners of war will get home! We know that you don't believe us any more! But you will see that we are speaking nothing but the truth! Two transports are going. The first half goes in the beginning of December, the second half in the middle of December."

Now, when ever a transport was about to start for home the Russians were accustomed to arouse general hope that more transports would leave in the near future, so that the men returning home would spread propaganda to this effect in Germany. In actual fact, however, no more transports followed. Although we had observed this for four and a half years, we thought that this time we could believe the promises of high-ranking NKVD officers. When we crossed the Russian-Polish border on 10 December 1949 an NKVD officer came to my car and said:

"Gentlemen, I have good news for you. A telegram has just been received here in Brest-Litovsk saying that the second half of your comrades have already en-trained and will start on the way home this evening."

And what was the actual truth? Of the 242 officers who had remained behind ten to forty were brought before courts-martial every day immediately after our departure and convicted. Only twenty started on the way home at the end of December and it is these men who informed us of the cruel end.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

3. Effect of Propaganda

To explain how propaganda works is at the same time to answer the question as to what are the final effects of all methods of control together. If the purpose of propaganda, as determined by the leaders of the Russian government, is achieved, this also serves to justify all the other methods of control. Therefore, the following statements constitute at the same time a final appraisal of all the psychological methods of control mentioned up to now. In the last chapter, "The Tactics of Political Demoralization," there is only a little to be added with respect to the Russian, but there are still some important things to be said concerning Europeans.

a. The Effect in Russia. The vital point of the Soviet Union is not situated west of the Petersburg, Moscow, Rostov line, but east thereof, rather, where the population has a strongly Mongolian character. And this type of human being reacts differently to propaganda and the other previously mentioned methods of control than does the European. The fact that only a few observers take this into consideration accounts for the many false judgments which are made concerning Russia. I have had a German General Staff officer from the "Foreign Armies" section tell me that Adolf Hitler judged the Soviet Union almost exclusively from Albrecht's book "Socialism Betrayed." No matter how correct the facts are which Albrecht reports he was mistaken in his final estimate of the Soviet Union's powers of resistance in a war. To be sure, the European man, who has become increasingly individualistic as the result of the intellectual development which began with the Renaissance, and who has been drawing the political consequences from this ever since the French Revolution, will see in the outbreak of war the time to shake off the Communist yoke. But it is different with Asiatics. For centuries they have known no other form of government than dictatorship. Their world is that of obedience, subjection, patience. The apathetic, vegetating masses lack activity.

I remember having read something like the following in a description of the Battle of Zorndorf by a Prussian cavalry officer:

"The Russians stood like walls. We fired, the bodies fell and piled up in heaps. That is the phenomenon of Asia, as the king says. The Prussian can do much, but he cannot do that. Prussia's strength lies in attack."

Nor will it be any different in any future conflicts: Blind obedience and the capacity for suffering of the Asiatic collective human being, who today more than ever lacks the idea of individuality as the result of Communist education, will be just as effective as in the past war.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

Moreover, an anti-Soviet revolution is improbable. The Red commissars, who themselves came to power as the result of revolution, have done all that is humanly possible with their methods of control to prevent being overthrown. The last means for this purpose are the "softening-up tactics," which will be described in Chapter VI, Section 2. Another important factor for the prevention of counterrevolution is the fact that they make the intellectual class beneficiaries of the system. In doing this too, the Soviets, as already mentioned, are experts. They know that in Asia in particular it is only by this class that revolutions are made.

Nevertheless, all this does not alter the fact that in this diabolical state cabinet revolts are very possible. Indeed, such revolts have always given a special stamp to Russian history. They are all the more possible because today the materialistic philosophy of life is unable to establish any ethical ties between the ruling class and the head of state.

However, in estimating the powers of resistance of the Soviet system one thing above all is of decisive importance and that is that Communism has strengthened the national consciousness of the Asiatic people. The wheel of history has moved! "We Slavs are destined to be the benefactors of humanity, the liberators of Europe from the capitalistic yoke!" A Rumanian officer, who had been for a fairly long time in a prisoner of war camp in Eastern Siberia, told me how a young Mongolian nurse expressed this idea again and again. "I was so weakened by hunger," he said, "that I could only drag myself through the camp with two sticks and again and again the nurse called to me, 'The hour approaches when we shall liberate your countries!' If I replied, 'What do you mean by liberate? You have brought me to the edge of the grave! Look at yourself, you are also hungry!' then she opened a briefcase and showed me one of the Communist propaganda leaflets where it said in black and white that the capitalistic countries were solely and exclusively responsible for the bad food situation of the Soviet Union and that the workers there were even hungrier than in the Soviet Union."

Communism has given the Asiatics the consciousness of a mission. This takes hold particularly among the youth. Again and again propaganda is able to put the blame for their misery on the country's enemies. Thus, the dissatisfaction of the people is converted into hatred of their future opponent. Here is one more interesting example of this.

In 1947 one of my comrades asked a young soldier who had returned from Germany whether he had seen that the German worker was better off under fascism than the Russians were under Communism (a very daring question!) The soldier replied:

~~RESTRICTED~~

"If we were worse off than you it was only your fault! I don't doubt that you were well off! The bad thing is that in spite of this you came to Russia to conquer us. This shows what beasts you really are!"

Naturally, one can also hear numerous opinions to the contrary; the old generation thinks differently. But the able-bodied young men think like this soldier! And that is the important thing. Added to this is the fact that the standard of living of the Russian people has improved considerably since January 1948 as the result of the discontinuation of compulsory food rationing. By relaxing the rules at the right time the commissars have shown that they knew how to nip in the bud the whiskered anti-Soviet propaganda which arose as the result of contact with the West. This is naturally easier to do in Russia than in European countries. For in view of their naivete and lack of need for civilized comforts the Russians can be easily convinced.

Here we see something which we shall find again later on in the discussion of the tactics of political demoralization. The commissars are flexible; they always know how far they can go. If they see that they have twisted the screws too tight they release them. And the broad masses fall into the trap. The opposition has again had the wind taken out of its sails for a time. The Rumanian university professor, who has already been mentioned before, always said, "The effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in Russia consists in the fact that the Asiatic today is still a man with a tail! He succumbs to these subtle tactics again and again."

Chapter VI will show that to a large extent this is also true of the modern European. Nevertheless, one cannot fail to realize that in propaganda intended for Europeans the Soviets have not given sufficient consideration to the European mentality, which is of a different type. To be sure, the Europeans can be duped for a time by propaganda, but not to the same extent as the Asiatics. The following pages will show how, in the way, the Soviets lost their battle of propaganda against the European prisoners of war.

b. Effect of Propaganda on European Prisoners of War, Especially Germans. Up to 1947 a relatively large number of prisoners succumbed to the Russian propaganda. People who had lost their nerve as the result of hunger, heavy labor and the fluctuation between fear and hope yielded to political pressure and hypnotized themselves into believing that they were convinced of the blessings of the Soviet state. Many also only outwardly pretended that they were. In actual truth they were not. After 1948, that is, from the time when more food was made available to the prisoners, the power of resistance against political pressure increased.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

How is this change to be explained?

(1) As already said, once their hunger ceased, the men began to think more clearly again.

(2) The prisoners had noticed that every Russian agreement to permit them to return home was nothing but an empty promise, for the purpose of keeping the men in suspense. They no longer believed the propaganda.

(3) The prisoners realized that in the final analysis their political attitude was irrelevant so far as their return was concerned. It became more and more apparent that the Russians sent some reactionaries home because they were unsuitable material for their propaganda, while they kept back political partisans since they needed them in the camps.

(4) It became evident that the Russians punished everybody under military law whom they could prove with some semblance of justice to be a war criminal -- anti-fascists in the same way as reactionaries. Gradually the following attitude began to prevail:

"No matter what I do, whether I am a reactionary or an anti-fascist, whether I work much or little, I cannot save myself. For the Soviet will to destroy is directed against the entire German people."

(5) Just as numerous prisoners had formerly "blown on the Red horn" out of opportunism, they now tried equally hard to join the reactionaries for the same reason. For they now began to be afraid for their reputations in the event of a return home. This went so far that registered anti-fascists in the last camp no longer dared to go to their political meetings openly. They sneaked in and out the back door, fearfully intent on not being seen.

(6) In addition to this, in our camp the Russians had really twisted the screws too tight. The NKVD officers carried on interrogations all day long to extort information. Searches were made for war criminals. Whoever did not confess was put into a dark cell. Men were carried off regularly and brought before courts. The last six months were the most nerve-racking of my captivity. In the evening propaganda meetings were held, the blessings of the Soviet Union were extolled, resolutions were drawn up to send greetings to Stalin and the Soviet Union was celebrated as the sole guarantor of peace. But the contrast between the will to destruction and recruitment by propaganda was still too strong. The prisoners began to be ashamed of going to these meetings. The numbers of those present dropped to eight percent. The Russians took this as a pretext to hunt for the "ringleaders" among the "reactionaries." For this purpose the commissar picked out a minister who was a

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

thorn in his side. The following conversation took place:

Question: "Why didn't you sign the last peace resolution?"

Answer: "Because I keep away from politics."

Question: "Do you realize that by this attitude of yours (1) you are sabotaging our efforts among the prisoners, efforts directed toward peace? If you had signed, then the 128 officers who attended your religious services last Sunday (the informers work well, the church-goers are counted!) would also have signed the resolution!"

Answer: "That is a matter which I cannot judge."

Question: "Did you realize that as a chaplain you have to advocate the cause of peace? You belong on the side of the poor who want peace, that is, on the side of the Soviet Union and not on the side of the capitalists! You should distribute propaganda for peace!"

Answer: "Herr Commissar, you are confusing the profession of a minister with that of a political activist! It is the duty of the church to make people directly responsible before God. Not only the capitalistic world of the West but also the Communist world of the East is responsible before God and under his jurisdiction!"

The commissar at first did not know what to say. After a fairly long pause he said, "You are denying your reformer. Luther took up the cause of the poor against the feudal rulers of the Middle Ages!"

Answer: "The purpose of the Reformation was to place man in a position of direct responsibility before God! No church nor any nation, whether capitalistic or Communist, can take this from him."

Question: "You don't know Luther! Like all movements in world history the Reformation was an economic and social one."

Answer: "Herr Commissar, if I am to discuss the Reformation with you I must expect of you a deeper grasp of the circumstances surrounding it. I consider it better to discontinue the discussion!"

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

I tell this because it indicates two things.

(1) If the Russians are no longer succeeding with their propaganda they look for the ringleaders of the opposing party. They do not hesitate to punish these men for "seditious activity" with 25 years exile in Siberia. They did not find any in the last camp. The prisoners had been too prudent to offer the commissars any pretext for intervention. For since the semblance of justice is preserved the pretext for applying it is the important thing!

(2) The attitude of the minister is the only possible one with which one can oppose a commissar. If the latter is vigorously attacked he generally retreats. The weakling, on the other hand, is trampled under foot. This experience holds true in all fields. It will find its confirmation in the following chapter.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

VI. The Tactics of Political Demoralization

The "divide et impera" of the Romans has always been a well-known means for gaining and maintaining power, but probably no one has ever applied it with such subtlety in the tactics of political demoralization as the Red commissars. In the chapter on "Fear and Hope" we said that all their methods of control together only serve to maintain a state of fluctuation between fear and hope. Here we can say that the final purpose of this state of fluctuation is political demoralization. As shown by the example given in the previous chapter concerning the application of dialectical methods in political practice, the Marxist theory also serves ultimately as a means of bringing about the demoralization and subjugation of all. In actual truth Russian Communism is a specific system of dominating human beings, a dictatorship working with subtle instruments of mass psychology.

One can say approximately the following:

1. Power is secured by the political-dialectical tactics of demoralization.

2. Once this has been achieved, it is consolidated by means of the same system. That is to say, the people are "reduced to a pulp," as one of my friends always expressed it. The place of a people bound to their native soil and village and organized according to classes and professions is taken by a uniform, propertyless swarm of people, moved about according to the political and economic intentions of Moscow, and divided into a few intellectuals and "specialists" on the one hand and a vegetating mass on the other. Due to the fact that nobody possesses anything, everybody is absolutely dependent on the state and can only live if he constantly proclaims his loyalty to the latter by signing the so-called resolutions. Everybody knows that he is watched by spies; any associations which may be formed are torn apart by constantly changing the place of work and constantly reorganizing the labor detachments. Such associations might become dangerous! The fanatical partisans of Communism quickly advance into political and economic administrative positions. The "party leaders," the intelligentsia and the hordes of specialists skim off the cream. The broad masses, who are exposed to constant pressure, live joylessly from day to day.

By means of the methods of control which have been described, the materialistic education, the debilitating way of working, the

constant shuffling of people, the uniformity of life, clothing and food, the Soviets have created a new kind of human being, the assembly line man, who has become a soulless automaton and is considered only as such by his rulers. Every individualistic trait is destroyed. It endangers the uniformity of the administration of the Soviet state. We called this condition "reducing people to a pulp."

We now turn to the first question. How is domination achieved by means of tactics of political demoralization? We illustrate it with the tactics of demoralization which were practiced in the prisoner of war camps after the Battle of Stalingrad. There was a difference between the goal of these tactics before Germany's surrender and afterwards. Accordingly, we make the following distinction:

a. Tactics of Demoralization in the Prisoner of War Camps from Stalingrad until the Surrender in 1945. The purpose of these tactics was to undermine the striking force of the German Army in the East by anti-Fascist propaganda. The German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union were supposed to become the bearers of this propaganda. The following account will describe only what is typical of the working procedure of the Soviets. It is not the author's intention to give a detailed history of Seydlitz' treason here.

First Phase: Immediately after the Battle of Stalingrad an attempt was made to bring about a state of intimidation by means of starvation, slander, the worst possible treatment and threats.

Second Phase: This began after about two months. With the aid of Communist emigrants from Germany who had been prepared and trained for this purpose in advance by the Soviets, anti-National Socialist propaganda was begun among the prisoners, especially the general officers and officers' corps, and appeals were made for Russo-German cooperation against Hitler. The procedure followed in this connection was exactly in accordance with the general rules described in Lenin's book, "Tactics and Strategy of World Revolution." In order to crush the power of a capitalistic state, according to Lenin's doctrine, one must first look for allies among the dissatisfied. One must make them empty promises to engage in joint political action directed at the overthrow of the existing system. Then when one has seized power one eliminates the other parties, or other organizations, which have helped the new regime into the saddle, in order to develop the purely Communist state. The rule of "mutatis mutandis" was applied to the prisoners of war, that is, one looked for those who were dissatisfied with National Socialism. It was thought that such men would be found among the general officers and in the General Staff, who, as the result of Hitler's treatment of the Army after the Fritsch affair, were no longer in complete agreement with National Socialism and who were embittered as the result of Hitler's serious strategic errors, particularly during the Battle of Stalingrad. It was also thought that

they would be found among the German university graduates of all professions, who are serving as officers, among the physicians, who considered that they had been robbed of their freedom by National Socialism, the lawyers, who disapproved of the legal views of the Third Reich, the theologians of both denominations, who considered Christianity in danger, the philologists, who disapproved of the new educational principles, and everywhere, too, sympathizers were found. Noncommissioned officers and enlisted men are not wooed in such large numbers as the officers. They are made submissive by starvation and extremely hard labor.

At the same time they looked among the general officers for ambitious men, whom the commissars quickly located with the assistance of the German emigrants. These men were handled in a special way. They were given empty promises, all of which ran more or less as follows:

"Germany's situation is hopeless! You, Herr General, as a good soldier, are best able to judge that. You know that Adolf Hitler is leading the German people to destruction by his insane policy and strategy. After Hitler's fall the important thing for us Russians is to have a strong and friendly Germany on our side. Think of the blessings of Bismarck's foreign policy! Think what advantages the Russo-German alliance in the 19th Century brought to both nations! We do not require you to become Communists. Regulate the social problem in the future Germany according to your own principles. Communism is not an exportable article (!!). (Anyone who is at all acquainted with the Soviet ideology should have seen through this crude swindle at the first glance.) Think of Germany after the war! In view of our struggle with the capitalistic countries of the West we need you!"

Whoever does not utter an unreserved "no" to these Circean lures was lost. And to utter such a refusal was especially difficult for ambitious men like Seydlitz and Lattmann. For to each of these still more was said:

"You, Herr General, are the man to influence the officers' corps in this way. You are the man to assume one of the highest executive positions in the future Germany!"

Since a part of the officers' corps and the enlisted men were of the opinion that it was "politically unintelligent" not to enter into the Russian game, officers' leagues and "Free Germany" national committees were formed, both of which were later united into the "National Committee for Free Germany." Those who joined these

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

organizations in writing found themselves in the hands of the commissars. For the latter now acted in accordance with this step.

Third Phase: This is characterized by an increasing degree of dependence on the Red commissar. It ends with the complete abandonment of his personality by the one who has fallen into dependence. Those who joined the officers' league were now in the commissar's trap. "You have told us in writing that you are convinced that National Socialism is plunging Germany into disaster with its erroneous policy. If you are an enemy of National Socialism you must do everything which will lead to the speedy destruction of the system!" This meant the betrayal of all the state secrets of the Reich, the demoralization of the German East front and homeland by leaflets and radio propaganda directed against Hitler, calling upon the soldiers to desert, the workers to stop their work in the factories.

Now anybody with any power of judgment must have a glimmering of what the Russians really wanted was demoralization of the German front in order to have an easy time with their opponent, destruction of the confidence existing between the government and the Wehrmacht in Germany. But it was very difficult to back out now, unless one was possessed of a strong character. For the commissars said to the leaders of the National Committee: "Your first signature makes you a traitor to Hitler. If we were to drop you over Berlin in a parachute you would be lost. Moreover, you have committed war crimes in Russia. Here is the evidence. We can send you to Siberia for 25 years!"

But the Soviets worked not by intimidation alone -- again the twofold method -- but also by positive propaganda aimed at winning men over to their cause. Russian-German meetings are held, model Soviet factories were exhibited, that is, "Potemkin villages," built especially for this purpose.

A special attempt was made to win over the chaplains. They did not try to intimidate the latter so much. By exposing the cruelties of Fascism on the one hand and proclaiming "religious" freedom in the Soviet Union on the other they attempted to draw them over to the Russian side. A few clergymen were conducted to the graves of Winniza. There it was "proved" to them that this was a case of the Fascists having shot Russians and that it was not a Soviet purge of Polish officers. In the meantime Polish officers who had returned from Russia declared that beyond any doubt the men lying in Winniza were comrades of theirs who had been shot by the Communists. The Russian commissars had been clever enough to remove the Polish uniforms from the corpses and dress them in Russian ones.

Conversations are arranged with Russian priests, all of whom bear witness to the religious freedom existing in the Soviet Union. The commissars are clever enough to use only little intimidation

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

against the priests, since they are afraid of losing the latter's followers, once they have discovered the duplicity.

We saw that the commissars knew how to pull all the stops. Satan assumed the form of an angel of light. And in this lay his greatest menace. A large number of the chaplains of both denominations fell victims to the swindle.

Here I might be permitted to digress for a moment. The Soviets attached particular value to the approval of the chaplains for two reasons.

(1) Because words spoken in favor of the Soviet Union by the preacher of the Truth are the very best propaganda for the Soviets. In such a case, the latter themselves remained in the background, glad as they were to see that others are performing valuable work for them.

(2) Because the Soviets knew that for those who offered opposition to the Communist system and who sought support in religion there was nothing more terrible than to see themselves abandoned by their chaplains from whom the greatest powers of resistance against the Communist system were to be expected. By destroying faith in the sincerity of the representatives of the ecclesiastical office the commissars struck a blow at their most dangerous enemy, religion itself! And during the period of captivity up to 1945 they succeeded in doing this to a great extent! A Protestant minister once said to me: "A hundred resolute ministers can never make good the sins committed here by ten corrupt ones!" One can only imagine what it meant to the simple soldier, who had been brought physically to the edge of the grave by starvation and hard labor, who was mentally torn by fear and hope and saw in the commissar the devil himself, when he heard his chaplain deliver statements about the humane sentiments of the Soviet Union. In such a case he despaired of his chaplains and of his church. And that was what the commissars wanted! This was how the powers of resistance were broken! In the eyes of the church-goers, however, the church was comprised by the conduct of the clergy. And that, too, was what the commissars wanted. In his statements regarding the concentration camps in the East zone Prior Grueber, who was otherwise a valiant opponent of Communism, has shown that even today the commissars are still successfully repeating the same fraud.

To resume my original train of thought, during the second phase the decision to commit treason is made easier by intimidation on the one hand and positive propaganda on the other. It was chiefly the leaders of the Seydlitz movement who were influenced.

At the same time the junior officers and enlisted men were exposed to pressure in the form of work which was without a parallel,

while receiving extremely little food. Anyone who did not join the National Committee for Free Germany was in danger of being physically destroyed. Men died of hunger by the thousands. And in spite of this Seydlitz, Lattmann and others did not abandon the path of treason! The phase of the deepest humiliation in the history of the Prussian-German army began. One has only to read the articles which Herr von Seydlitz, Herr Lattmann, Freiherr von Beaulieu, Graf Einsiedel, and others have written in the black-white-red* newspaper of the National Committee for Free Germany!

A Luftwaffe General Staff officer prepared a plan as to how Russia can best attack Berlin from the air without being prevented by the flak! Appeals were sent to the German army in the East to lay down its arms. "The prisoners of war in the Soviet Union are well off!" said the leaflets. And the leaders of the Seydlitz movement signed everything. The constant fear of physical destruction causes the majority of the soldiers and fifty percent of the officers to place their signatures under treasonable documents. How is that to be explained?

The combined effect of all the methods of control which we have described up to now had so broken the inner powers of resistance of these men that they could no longer summon the strength to follow the path of honor. It is a known fact that cerebral activity depends on physical well-being. But those who have not been personally exposed to the Russian methods of control can hardly imagine to what extent this is true. A man hypnotizes himself into believing that the path of treason is in actual truth the act of a Yorck.** How often Seydlitz compared himself with Yorck! The longer men are exposed to the methods of control the fewer becomes the number of those able to resist. And Russia takes its time! Its mills grind slowly. The fear of standing alone drives the last ones into the arms of the traitors. The men hypnotize each other into believing that the step which they have taken is an honorable one!

To be sure, this is all forced reasoning, because, after all, it is impossible to silence the conscience. A clergyman told me of an experience dating from 1944 - 45, which I must repeat.

There were about 900 officers and enlisted men billeted in a camp near Moscow. Propaganda, based on terrible hunger, was carried on for the National Committee for Free Germany. Added to this was the artificially cultivated fear that those men who did not join the committee would never see their homes again. A further effect was produced by the

* For the colors of imperial Germany.

** Prussian field marshal who first fought on the side of Napoleon against Russia and later deserted him to sign a neutrality pact with the Russians.

hope that those who joined the committee would be safe from proscription. One convinced oneself that Germany's salvation lay in cooperation with Russia after the war. Although their eyes were wide open the men no longer realized that the actual facts in politics, the conduct of the war and the treatment of prisoners proved the opposite. The Soviet Union wanted to annihilate Germany, and the few men who perceived this did not dare to say so, for that would have been counterpropaganda, punishable with forced labor in Siberia. Thus, the majority parroted the Communist phrases of peace and good will on earth. They clung to them all the more, because their conscience drove them in a different direction. The number of non-members of the National Committee dropped more and more with each meeting. At first there were still 450 out of 900 who stood fast under the nervous strain, then 400, then 300, 100, 50, 30. The number dropped to five! In April 1945 these five were lonely and alone, outlawed by all as traitors to the cause of Germany's future, and repeated to each other the words of Martin Luther: "There is nothing more dangerous than to act contrary to the voice of conscience!" They were three chaplains of the Protestant Church, which was persecuted by the National Socialists, one of them a regular officer and one of them a convinced National Socialist! In such a way the front had shifted!

In other camps the numerical proportion between non-members and members of the National Committee was considerably more favorable -- about fifty percent among the officers. This example is only intended to show the effect exerted on people by the combination of the various Communist methods of control over a fairly long period of time. The question is "Should the individual be made responsible for his defection?"

However, before discussing the question of guilt brief mention should be made of the methods used to gain Herr Paulus as a member, who at first had kept aloof from the National Committee. For it shows with what skill the Soviets work. Paulus was a man of vacillating nature but he was not an ambitious man. A senior general staff officer told me that up to the summer of 1944 Paulus was unable to decide either for or against Seydlitz. He always declared: "My time has not yet come!" In the summer of 1944 -- the exact date escaped my memory -- after long and hitherto fruitless attempts to win Paulus over, Melnikov, the Chief of the NKVD, invited him and several German army generals and senior NKVD officers to a champagne breakfast. During the breakfast a Russian orderly appeared and requested NKVD Chief Melnikov to step outside. After reentering the room he said to Paulus:

"Stalin was on the telephone and has instructed me to tell you that at present there is a Polish delegation in Moscow which is proposing active cooperation between Russia and Poland for the postwar

period and which demands that the German eastern territory be separated from the rest of the country up to the Oder-Neisse line. However, after this war Stalin would prefer to cooperate with a strong Germany. But he requires you to join the National Committee and take over the educational work which is necessary for Russo-German cooperation, as well as to guarantee that Germany will be on Russia's side during the coming political events. Under these conditions he will respect Germany's territorial borders as of 1938. Stalin requests your decision by tomorrow noon!"

Paulus joined the National Committee, but asked that his former army chief of staff, Generalleutnant Schmidt, who was in a different camp and who had been separated from his former commander in chief on purpose, be informed of his step and at the same time invited to join. General von Arnim, who had joined the National Committee with Paulus after the champagne breakfast, undertook to do this.

The conversation between Generalleutnant Schmidt and General von Arnim had a result which was extremely disagreeable to the NKVD. General Schmidt succeeded in convincing von Arnim that he and Paulus had been the victims of a cruel swindle. The conversation, at which General Rodenburg, who shared General Schmidt's opinion, was also present, took a very violent course and ended with an outburst of tears on the part of General von Arnim. Von Arnim was of strong enough character to draw the logical conclusions. He resigned from the National Committee, to which he had only belonged for a few days. Paulus, on the other hand, never withdrew his signature. (I owe my knowledge of this affair to the accounts given by Generalleutnant Schmidt and General Rodenburg.)

Some time later an article appeared in the Russian newspapers concerning the result of the Russian-Polish negotiations. As was to be expected, Soviet Russia, together with Poland, had designated the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's eastern border. The despicable game they had played with Paulus was unmasked. None of the chief traitors drew the only possible conclusion from this. The few protests by individual followers of the National Committee to the effect that these territorial concessions to Poland were contrary to the agreements were rejected by the Communists with scorn.

When democratic political parties were formed in Germany after the collapse of our government, Seydlitz dissolved the National Committee at the recommendation of the Russians. They claimed that it had now lost its purpose, since the reorganization of the government was guaranteed by the democratic forces in Germany itself. The black-white-red flags of the National Committee for Free Germany

vanished. The "Anti-Fascist Committee," which was now organized by the Russians, displayed only black-red-gold and red flags. "The Moor has done his duty, the Moor can go." So ends the history of the betrayal.

Even though the effect of their propaganda against the front and the zone of the interior was comparatively slight the Soviets nevertheless succeeded in the following:

(1) Undermining the confidence between the leaders of the government and the Army.

(2) Demoralizing the German officers' corps from within in a way which no one could have dreamed of before the war.

It remains to be seen whether any additional "prominent representatives" will appear besides the former members of the National Committee who are still in the East Zone today. They probably constitute a political reserve of the Soviet Union. It is possible that in order to keep them under pressure one or the other of them are sent to Siberia.

Let us sum up the Soviet methods once again.

First Phase: Paralyzation of the mental and physical power of resistance by means of intimidation.

Second Phase: Seduction of their original opponents by means of empty promises in order to climb into the saddle themselves.

Third Phase: Gradual and complete breaking of the moral backbone of the man whom they have won over with empty promises and his degradation into a blind tool of Communist power politics.

That is the fate of every individual, every organization and every party which extends as much as its little finger to the Red commissar.

Up to now no system in the world has shown itself able to cope with the cunning tactics of Communism.

b. Tactics of Demoralization After the Collapse. Their objective was to destroy the inner structure of the German Wehrmacht in such a way that Germany would no longer have any possibility of reorganizing a new army out of the remnants of the old. To a large extent the Russians succeeded in doing this. Together with this objective they were interested in gaining adherents for Communism. This they did not succeed in doing! More than ninety percent of the former prisoners of war do not want to have anything more to do with Communism.

The system of demoralization after the collapse was in principle the same as before. We can, therefore, be brief.

First Phase: To cause physical and nervous exhaustion through hunger and by maintaining the state of fluctuation between fear and hope.

Second Phase: To win over prisoners for what were at first general democratic currents of thought. For this purpose an anti-Fascist committee was formed, which was at first generally headed by moderate men. They were told that "We do not want to make Communists out of the prisoners, but we want to educate them to be democrats!" Then one day the commissar appeared and called upon the head of the anti-Fascist committee to submit a resolution to the prisoners for their signatures which contained a profession of democracy and friendship with the Soviet Union. The prisoners were now in a difficult position. Those with any power of judgment realized that this was the beginning of a transparent game, that the commissars gradually wanted to get political control of the prisoners. Fearful of being charged with having a Fascist and anti-Soviet attitude if they did not sign, the majority decided to sign. In my camp there were not even ten percent who dared to refuse their signatures. Those who did not sign refused to do so for the following reasons:

(1) Even if the text of the resolution was so phrased that one could sign it as such with a good conscience the essential thing there was not what was being signed but rather the fact of the signature itself! It was the intention of the Soviets to demoralize us politically. We could avoid this only by refusing to adopt any political attitude from the very first. The Russians were to be told the following as an official reason: "We are prisoners of war and it is therefore our duty to be nonpolitical."

(2) In view of the ideological attitude of the Russians it was impossible that they should educate us along the lines of western democracy. The Russians only created a point of departure for a Marxist-Communist education. If we were to sign this generally phrased democratic resolution and then later refuse to sign purely Communist resolutions the commissar will probably tell us that "We now see that you are our determined enemies. For you are followers of the ideology of the western powers!" This too made it seem expedient not to extend even one's little finger to the Soviets.

(3) For the Russians the purpose of the resolution was to establish a propagandistic foundation for exerting political influence on the home front. If resolutions by prisoners of war who have decided in favor of Russo-German friendship were to appear in German newspapers this must, in the light of the Russian policy of violence

in Germany (Oder-Neisse line, forced deportations of civilians to Siberia), be regarded by decent men as treason. For after that the power of resistance of the population in the East Zone would be weakened. The latter would say that "If even our former soldiers are playing the political game of the Communists, what are we to do!" A signature, therefore, was an offense against honor.

(4) In actual truth we were endangering our return home by pro-Russian resolutions. For in view of the trends in the Soviet philosophy of life it was out of the question that the Soviet Union would ever send us home, unless under pressure by the British and Americans. However, the latter will have absolutely no interest in the repatriation of prisoners who would have decided in favor of cooperation with Russia. Therefore, expediency too spoke in favor of refusing one's signature.

(5) For the Russians an additional purpose of the resolution was to find out the political views of the individual as well as his powers of resistance against their tactics of attrition. They could only be opposed by having either all sign or none. The former course was impossible for the reasons under 1 - 4. The history of the National Committee for Free Germany shows that the resolutions always become more pro-Soviet up to the point when one's national and personal dignity is sacrificed. Therefore, there was nothing left to do but to refuse in a body to sign the first resolution.

(6) The danger of not seeing one's home again because of a reactionary attitude was not eliminated by signing the first, innocent resolutions. For then the same charge would be raised at a later date in what may possibly be a much more unpleasant form. If we were to sign the first resolutions the Russians would have seen that we were weak. Then later this weakness would cause them to get an even tighter hold on us, since his methods of pressure would have already brought him results.

(7) As their former conduct clearly showed, it was the intention of the Russians to break our moral backbone. This tendency had to be opposed from the very beginning with our entire strength.

If those men who did not let their moral backbone be broken were never to see their homeland again this would be easier to bear than the loss of their honor.

Developments showed that this reasoning was the only correct one. Those who refused to sign any political document from the beginning did not fare any worse than the others. On the contrary, since they had proved themselves unsuitable subjects they were no

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

longer exposed to such strong political pressure in the future as the others. From one thing, to be sure, we had to guard ourselves with extreme care and that was against any attempt to win converts for the above line of reasoning! For that was counterpropaganda and instigation to revolt. Thus, it was impossible to keep others from taking a false step. One possibility of exerting influence was naturally not excluded and that was one's own example. But even this was dangerous.

Nevertheless, it was never my personal experience that one's attitude alone would have sufficed for condemnation, although if one told the commissars during an interrogation that one refrained from any anti-Communist propaganda they repeatedly said, "Watch yourself! You are carrying on counterpropaganda by your attitude!" However, since the Russians are constantly concerned with the preservation of a semblance of justice they seek a tangible reason for a legal condemnation. Naturally, it is obvious that they made a particular effort to prove war crimes against the "reactionaries," and in many cases they succeeded in this.

Third Phase: The hitherto moderate leader of the anti-Fascist committee was called upon to practice Marxist propaganda. If he refused to do this he was charged with displaying an anti-Soviet attitude. He would then be told, "You are actually much worse than the reactionaries! At least the latter openly express what they think; you, on the other hand, have deceived me!" A Communist anti-Fascist leader was appointed. To an increasing extent the text of the resolutions required of the camp community made the prisoners the tools of the Soviet policy of violence in Germany. In addition to that the Antifa (Anti-Fascist) leader was required to work as an informer, that is, his last scrap of honor was taken away from him. If he refused he was told that "It is the duty of every Communist to bring about the downfall of the enemies of world revolution by all possible means. If you do not do this you are our enemy!"

During the epoch after 1945, therefore, the same tactics were in principle to be found as before that time. There was only one means of asserting oneself against them and that was an unreserved "no" from the very beginning! However, since only a few strong characters were able to do this the Russians succeeded again and again with their system of demoralization. As one soldier expressed it, they play on "the keyboard of human weaknesses."

However, if a community succeeded in forming a united front which is able to utter this unreserved "no," the commissar at first retreated. This was clearly noticeable in the treatment received by fifty Rumanian officers who had proved themselves unsuitable subjects for political influence in various camps and were therefore separated from the majority of the Rumanian officers and handed over

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

to the special treatment of the NKVD master mentioned in the chapter on "Fear and Hope." Even this master of demoralization did not succeed in breaking their spirit. They answered every irregularity on the part of the Russians with a hunger strike. The Russians always yielded. A hunger strike by an individual makes little impression. A united hunger strike by an entire camp, on the other hand, is extremely unpleasant for the commissar, not, for example, because he feared being called to account for treating the prisoners unjustly, but rather because the fact that a solid community is united among themselves is interpreted as a lack on his part of mastery of the tactics of demoralization. He was necessarily afraid, therefore, of losing his position! German and Rumanian officers who were captured at the Battle of Stalingrad learned this lesson in the course of numerous hunger strikes. Mastery of the tactics of demoralization, therefore, is regarded by Moscow as the most important qualification for the profession of commissar.

3. Is the Weakening of Prisoners in the Face of Soviet Methods of Control a Crime?

In this question a distinction must be made between the time before the surrender in 1945 and afterwards. Up to the surrender it was, under the prevailing law, high treason and a breach of one's oath of allegiance to join the National Committee for Free Germany. After the surrender one could no longer talk of the breach of any oath of allegiance.

a. The Question of Guilt During the Period up to the Surrender. Here the question is whether the adherents of the Seydlitz movement were confronted with a genuine ethical conflict in which they were able to make a responsible decision in either of two different ways. Was their situation, therefore, in any way comparable with that of the men around von Witzleben and Beck on the twentieth of July?

However, before this question can be answered one must decide whether anybody who has yielded to these refined and satanic methods can be held responsible at all? Were there prisoners in complete possession of their mental faculties? Unquestionably, each individual case should be examined. Nevertheless, anyone who advocates a general acquittal ignores the phenomenon of the responsibility of the individual for his actions.

Even if mitigating circumstances are recognized, it is necessary to apply a strict rule, otherwise we depart from the concept of honor and loyalty to one's native soil. Apart from all psychological attempts to understand the problem, one must bear in mind that life constantly involves the making of responsible decisions. Otherwise we fail to do justice to the reality of human life!

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

In discussing the question as to whether the men in the Seydlitz movement were confronted by a genuine ethical conflict, two points of view are represented:

(1) A moderate point of view, which is also taken by, among others, such outstanding individuals as Generalleutnant Schmidt and Generalmajor Rodenburg. They say that numerous members of the Seydlitz movement, including even Seydlitz himself at the beginning, were confronted by a genuine ethical conflict. Since they were subjectively convinced that Germany could only be saved by close Russo-German co-operation even during their captivity they thought that they had to break their oath. Their objectively erroneous judgment of the Soviet promises cannot be absolutely considered as guilt. Nevertheless, there was a point of time after which the objective untruth of the Russian promises was so clearly evident that there was no longer a situation of ethical conflict. That was in the autumn of 1944 when the Russo-Polish agreement concerning the Oder-Neisse line appeared in all the Russian newspapers. Honor then required them to resign from the National Committee. However, only a few summoned the strength to take this step. Whoever did so can be regarded as having been rehabilitated, for it is more difficult to revoke a false decision when reprisals can be expected than to say "no" from the very beginning. Those who were unable to say "no" at that time lost their honor.

(2) The Radical Point of View. According to my observation this is shared by the larger number of non-members of the Seydlitz movement, especially by those who were not shown any "Potemkin villages" by the Russians and were only exposed to hunger and mental pressure. They claim that:

(a) For a prisoner of war there can be no political conflict whatsoever. He must regard the detaining power as his enemy up to the conclusion of peace. And everything which comes from the enemy is bad! It is intolerable that a soldier should release himself from the rules governing his conduct in captivity which were printed in every pay book.

(b) The military and political situation cannot be judged at all from behind barbed wire. One always sees only one side and this side only in a distorted form. It is, therefore, irresponsible for a prisoner to make any political decision of historic importance which is contrary to his oath of allegiance.

(c) If all the various factors were clearly and objectively considered it was possible to recognize the falsehood of the Russian game from the very beginning.

(d) As the result of the division it caused among the prisoners, the treason of Seydlitz provided the Russians with

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

the foundation for the work of the Red commissars in exploiting the labor of the soldiers and breaking their moral backbone. Seydlitz and his followers bear the responsibility for this.

(e) The comparison of Seydlitz with the men of 20 July is especially false because of point b.

For fundamental reasons one must, in my opinion, adopt the radical point of view. However, this does not relieve one of the duty of treating each individual case separately.

b. After the surrender the soldier was released from his oath; the preservation of his honor, however, remained his highest commandment.

Those who joined the Antifa committee out of objective conviction cannot be charged with treason a priori. However, a thinking prisoner of war must have recognized by the development of the National Committee for Free Germany the aims which the Russians were actually pursuing with their Antifa committee, demoralization and the breaking of the moral backbone of all prisoners. The detailed reasons which spoke against any acquiescence to the attempts to exert political influence are described on pages 97 - 100. After 1945 it was difficult to resist the Russian tactics of demoralization due to the fact that the average behavior of the men captured at the time of the surrender was poor. They felt that they were released from their oath and thought primarily only of how they could make things easiest for themselves in captivity. The political collapse was followed by a moral collapse. In the beginning the number of those who offered resistance to the Soviet tactics of demoralization was low. When the frightful consequences became evident it was too late.

The time after which the real intentions which the Russians were pursuing with their Antifa committee became plain even to those with less powers of judgment varied in the different camps. After January 1948, however -- and that is the latest deadline -- the tactics which the Russians were pursuing must have been clear even to those without any power of judgment. Anyone who belonged to the anti-Fascist committee after January 1948 cannot be absolved of moral guilt. The sole exception are those prisoners who fell victims to Soviet deception because they were exclusively in a propaganda camp.

That an increasingly large number of prisoners altered their political views after 1948 has already been mentioned.

4. Behavior of Various Nationalities, Professions and Religious Denominations.

It was difficult to perceive any difference in the behavior of the various European nationalities (I had no personal experience

with Finns). It may be of some importance to the future to know that in captivity a like attitude among the prisoners bursts the bounds of nationality. The Rumanian of strong character became the friend of the German of strong character and both despised the defaulters among their own ranks. Germans, Hungarians, Italians and Rumanians learned that the common European cultural tradition means a common obligation. National distinctions pale in comparison with this.

Nor is there any profession of which it could be said that the behavior of its members was substantially superior to the others. There were men of strong character, who trod the straight and narrow path, unperturbed, among generals and general staff officers, the academic professions, among clerks, farmers and workers. But there were just as many defaulters. The result is that for the man who has returned from Russian captivity, class and professional distinctions are no longer of any importance. He respects only the way a man behaves under adversity. A completely new stratification developed; farmers and workers of strong character stood on the same place with the general and the university professor of strong character. There was practically no conflict between social classes, as after 1918. To be sure, as the result of the defection of large elements among the officers' corps this class has become discredited among the people.

The same picture resulted with respect to religious denomination. There were both defaulters and worthy representatives among Protestants, Catholics and the members of other religious faiths. This also applies to the clergy. Regarded as a whole, it must be said that the defaulters among the latter were numerically few. However, this does not apply to the clergymen of both denominations who were captured before 1945.

Nor did the average officer candidate display a superior behavior to other students. The 150 percent National Socialist did not behave any better than the reactionary. The origin of the officers, whether they were counts or farmers' sons, was also irrelevant. Nevertheless, speaking as cautiously as possible, two things can be said:

(1) On the average the younger men behaved better than the older ones. The impulse toward self-preservation is naturally greater among older people.

(2) Among officers the ones who behaved most honorably were the young field and company grade officers, 25 to 40 years old, with pre-war training and education, that is, soldiers, most of whom had entered the army during the years from 1934 to 1938 after the time of the 100,000-man army. Among the enlisted men the behavior of the Waffen-SS was the best. As the result of their recruiting rules the SS could pick the best candidates.

Captivity constitutes a test of character. It is no longer possible to doubt the strength of character of a man who over a period of years has trod the path of honor, in hunger and cold, and while constantly exposed to mental pressure. It is an interesting fact that some soldiers with high decorations for bravery (Knight's Cross) failed completely to come up to expectations. The ambition which impelled them to perform some outwardly great deed on the battlefield produced only negative results in captivity. Those who wanted to play a big part joined the Party. Moreover, years of physical and mental torment in captivity put far more strain on a man's character than did the mental tensions suffered on the battlefield, which always lasted for only a fairly short time.

The lack of a religious and ideological support is discussed in Chapter VI.

The commissars quickly recognized the weakness of the European. The previously mentioned NKVD "master" once remarked to a Hungarian lieutenant colonel, "What is Europe! We are only playing with you!" But just as the commissar despised the great majority of the prisoners he respected the man of strong character, and this despite his intention to destroy him. When, for example, Generalleutnant Schmidt, who, in 1943, during captivity, had been subjected to a six-month period of frightful physical and mental pressure, stubbornly refused to join the National Committee, Melnikov, the Chief of the NKVD, stood up after his last interrogation and declared: "Herr General! You are the first German general for whom I have any respect!"

Following that Generalleutnant Schmidt was released from prison and was never interrogated again up to the spring of 1949, when I was separated from him! The fact that today he has probably been condemned in spite of this is in conformance with the trend toward annihilation.

VII. The Prerequisites for the Defeat of Communism

1. Brief Summary of the Efforts of the Methods of Control

a. On Asiatics. The passivity of the Asiatic, his centuries-old habituation to dictatorship, enable him to endure the physical and mental strains of the present time. He lives in hope of the socialistic paradise. The possibility of any counterrevolution is eliminated by the cultivation of stereotyped human beings and a thoroughly organized system of informers. The whole Asiatic area is harnessed to the coercive machine of the Communist structure. Political propaganda wins over large numbers of the youth for the messianic mission of the Asiatic people; this infuses the colossus, which in former centuries was apathetic and brooding, with vital striking power. The victory of 1945 has made the people more aware of themselves. One should not allow oneself to be deceived into thinking that contact of Russian soldiers with European civilization will decisively prejudice the powers of resistance of the Soviet Union in a war.

In their methods of control, and especially by clever coordinating one method of control with the other, as well as by their flexibility in having first one and then the other method of control appear in the foreground, the Soviets have developed a system which assures them complete domination of the Slavic-Asiatic area. In this lies the secret of the Soviet state!

b. On Europeans. The demoralizing effect of their methods of control on Europeans increased the power of the Soviet state. The European nations which are under the Russian aegis are kept so in check that effective resistance is not possible. However, the different mentality of the European, as well as the sense of freedom inherent in his intellectual history and brought about by his political institutions, will induce him to shake off the Communist yoke at the first opportunity. The Communist system has no powerful appeal for us.

From sections a and b the following conclusion may be drawn. There can be no thought of any internal movement among the subjugated nations to shake off the Communist yoke.

2. Possibilities of Resistance

From what has been said hitherto the question arises as to whether there is any possibility at all for the people under Communist domination to escape from a fate of physical, mental and

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

spiritual enslavement. The following observations derived from captivity may perhaps be important for this question:

a. Self-Help. United, passive resistance has actually always been successful, provided that it was practiced while appealing to the basic constitutional rights or to the legal provisions of the state. Reference has already been made to the fact that in many fields the Russians have two different kinds of orders:

(1) An official order, which is intended to influence world opinion.

(2) A secret counterorder.

It is necessary to take advantage of this contradiction. During our captivity we constantly made capital out of this fact. Against the secret orders to exert pressure on field officers through forced labor we appealed to the official Russian regulations and refused to work, although, to be sure, only a few dared to do this during the first years. Against all forms of political pressure we appealed to the political freedom granted to all prisoners of war, while against the constant attempt to prevent religious services we appealed to the freedom of religion. Naturally, this procedure requires men who are tough. One had to fight every day. That cost nervous and physical energy. One was standing constantly with one foot in Siberia.

Besides that, if effective success is desired there must be participation on a large scale in demanding the rights which are officially permitted.

The Russians are definitely afraid of a firmly united front. One of the most important lessons learned during our captivity was that they always give way before such a front. In camps where their program of political demoralization did not succeed or where fairly large groups held together in a body this always had beneficial results for all. In such cases, the Russians did not dare to trifle with the prisoners. However, the more the commissars gave way the more dangerous the situation for the resistance front became. For those without any power of judgment became convinced that they could come to terms with the commissars and they voted for compromises. The commissars destroyed the united front by its very willingness to yield. They knew that after the first battle, especially if it ended in a victory, every prisoner would at last want to relieve the pressure on him, and that his intelligence, which was guided by mental and physical desires, would argue in favor of compromise. Every NKVD lieutenant was trained in these Leninesque tactics of evasion.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

UNCLASSIFIED

To be sure, the question arises as to whether there are enough men and women in modern European countries who are determined to take a united stand (for example, in the field of religion) regardless of the final consequences. If the commissars feel that the will to persist to the final consequences is lacking, the battle is lost. During our captivity there were only a few men of European nationality who were prepared to take up such a stand with all its consequences. The reason for this will be discussed in Chapter II.

It is not necessary to discuss in any greater detail the conclusions which can also be drawn from these last remarks with reference to the foreign-political attitude toward the Soviet Union. Even the Kremlin gives way before a really strong power.

b. Help from Outside. The European peoples who are living under Soviet domination, especially those in the East Zone of Germany, which is only relatively isolated from the West, can, however, be given effective aid from outside.

My experience as a prisoner of war shows that in spite of all the persistence with which the Russians seek to realize their aims they are very sensitive to any foreign propaganda which interferes with these aims. In the Soviet Union we were fully convinced that the sudden improvement in living conditions in the prisoner of war camps which began after 1948 was due exclusively to the vigorous anti-Soviet propaganda of the West. The Kremlin saw that if it continued its previous treatment of prisoners, which became known to the world at large through the men returning home, it would lose its last Communist voter in the West; so it changed its ways.

In a similar way Western Germany must be made a mouthpiece for what the East Zone can no longer say. Apart from this, the situation in the East Zone would already be much worse if every measure of the Soviets was not made known and laid bare through the international observation post of Berlin. But here we can provide even more decisive aid. For if the Kremlin adheres to its policy of demoralizing the western world it cannot afford to have a specific number of Communist voters in the West trodden under foot. It must, therefore, make certain concessions which will benefit the East German population. Things will be different, of course, if Moscow withdraws behind the Iron Curtain and limits itself to mobilizing the eastern area occupied by it. Then aid will no longer be possible. On the contrary, however, there have been, up to now, no indications whatsoever that the Russians are planning anything of the kind.

The same holds true with respect to the question as to how one can help the prisoners of war who have been condemned in the Soviet Union. There is no question but that we are by no means

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

exhausting our resources in this respect. If today Western Germany were swept by even one single storm of indignation at the mass convictions in the East the Soviets would at the very least send a few trains of prisoners home for propagandistic reasons. The oft-heard view that one should not irritate the Russians is exactly what Moscow wants. It wants, namely, to continue its annihilation project in peace without being exposed. I am convinced that there is only one means of helping prisoners. To keep the world conscience awake until Moscow weakens. There is an abundance of well-substantiated material available. The commissars must be constantly attacked on this point, otherwise our brothers will be the victims of the Soviet delaying tactics.

3. The Future of Europe Depends on the Formation of an All-Embracing Philosophy

In the introduction we gave two decisive reasons for the defection of the European when confronted with the Communist system: (There are still other reasons to be mentioned for the defection of German officers. To discuss them, however, would lead us too far afield.)

(1) The complete ignorance of the Communist system and its tactics.

(2) The "lack of a point of reference" -- as we called it -- of the modern European. The conduct of the Japanese shows what a bulwark a compact philosophy is when engaged in a struggle against the methods of demoralization employed by the Red commissars. The European was denied the support of a compact philosophy such as this. Thus, only a few men among us, who were endowed by nature with strong characters, stood the test in the struggle against Communism.

Whereas the first lack can be easily remedied the second is the legacy of a gradual disintegration of the religious and ethical foundations of our being, which has extended over a period of centuries. We no longer know to what we owe allegiance, we fluctuate between the various philosophical and scientific world trends. And in the political field it is the same, especially in Germany. Even the young men at college actually learn a different philosophy of life in each of the most important subjects. In Religion he is instructed in the teachings of Christianity; in German he is converted to idealism or naturalism according to the attitude of his professor; in History he is educated to be an Athenian democrat or an admirer of the conservative Prussian; and Materialism was trumps in the Natural Sciences until not so very long ago. We are no longer able to put these things in their right place. There is a lack of cultural synthesis.

UNCLASSIFIED

This produces an educated man who even from his school days is uncertain and inwardly perplexed, for whom everything has become relative. Such a man cannot cope with the representative of dialectical materialism who defends his principles in all fields of existence in a logical way. National Socialism recognized the philosophical and political weakness of modern Europe very clearly; it proposed to overcome the philosophical weakness by a racial and biological conception of existence and to overcome Europe's political disunity by the concept of the Reich [empire] as a European power for order. The philosophical questionableness of its ideological foundation was recognized by responsible men as early as 1933. The transfer of its philosophical ideology to politics led to Germany's complete collapse. Hitler thereby buried the medieval idea of the Reich forever. Nevertheless, it is easy to criticize National Socialism today; the important problem is to overcome its causes. For after all it is only the fruit of a western thinking which has lost its roots.

I do not think that medieval man, who possessed a definite picture of the world and who ordered all the aspects of life from a central Christian vantage point, would have been found so wanting when confronted by a Communist system as has the modern European. The same thing is true, for example, of Eighteenth Century Prussian. The latter too live, as it were, in a dome, in which all the aspects of existence converged at the highest point, like the ribs supporting the vault. The old Prussians also ordered their entire lives in line with their responsibility to God and these ideas were still alive among the founders of the Empire of 1871. We ought not to disavow these roots of our past, which like all historical existence also had their shady side. The Americans know very well why they have their officers study the old Prussians.

What a uniform picture of the world means could be seen -- as already mentioned -- among the Japanese in captivity. When an NKVD officer delivered a Marxist lecture in one camp the senior Japanese officer stood up after a short time and declared: "Why do you teach us Karl Marx? We have nothing to do with him! We have entirely different views in all fields! We won't listen to your lecture any longer!" Upon which he gave an order and the Japanese left the hall in a body down to the youngest soldier. When the commissar wanted to replace the Japanese colonel by another officer the Japanese said: "This colonel is the representative of the emperor. We will not obey anybody else!" And they did not do so either. I can imagine that a Prussian officer of the Eighteenth Century would have acted similarly in the name of his king, who had been ordained by God.

As long as we in the West first do not bring our own religious and philosophical bankruptcy to an end, and, second, do not constructively overcome the dreadful political division in the

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

European-American world -- and this is not to be done solely by international treaties -- and, third, solve our economic problems and the social question which is closely connected with them, every prerequisite for the conquest of Communism is lacking. Neither the Atlantic Pact, nor the Council of Europe, nor the Marshall Plan, nor military armament will provide an adequate bulwark against Communism. By this I do not mean to say that we are not obliged to establish all these safeguards against the danger from the East. On the contrary, this compels us to do even more in this respect. But all that is not enough.

Those who have personally experienced the disastrous helplessness of Europeans against Communism while in captivity, those who saw the frightful debasement of all ethical concepts, know that Europe today is confronted with a decision unlike any it has ever faced.

I shall never forget the time when a small group of officers and SS-leaders debated, with the help of Kant's "Critique of Practical Reason," the question: "Is man an intellectual being possessing free will for ethical action, or is he only a product of Nature subject to the instinct of self-preservation -- a bit of matter?" It was an SS-leader who, in a matter-of-fact manner, raised the problem "Suppose we were sent to Siberia for twenty-five years," he said. "The world would never again hear anything about our doings. Enervated by coercive measures and hunger, who among us would resist the temptation to help himself to food in the kitchen at the expense of his colleagues -- provided he felt himself unwatched. Does there exist a freedom between right and wrong or is Luther to be believed when he stated: 'Be you real men, and be you honest with yourselves, for who among you has mastered his nature except by grace?' Is there any freedom of action according to the ethical dictum 'you must' without God?"

This SS-leader who had wrestled with the problem for many days and nights, was shipped to Siberia. How will he act?

Here lies, if I see it correctly, the focal problem. Its solution is the decisive step. It is to be followed by the second step, the importance of which we did not realize for a long time, namely to find from this stage a way to shape our lives, that is, to build up a culture, a European-American community of nations, an economy and a socialism deeply rooted in a philosophy embracing God, the world and humanity.

To be sure, if Spengler's theories, expounded in "The Decline of the West" are right then all these questions are without meaning. Then the end is inevitable.

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

UNCLASSIFIED

I believe, however, that our historical future is not determined by Spengler's dire prophecies, but is determined by faith and ethical actions.

Thus, the European-American world will have to choose whether it wishes to emerge from the catastrophe cleansed or face annihilation.

UNCLASSIFIED
~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~
(Security Information)

UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION

No. of Copies

20	Office, Chief of Military History
12	Historical Division
40	Seventh Army
7	Headquarters, European Command
3	Intelligence School
2	Berlin Military Post
3	SHAPE
1	COMNAVFORGER
1	USAFE
11	Military Posts

UNCLASSIFIED

~~RESTRICTED~~

H

COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS



3 1695 00621 9810